

**A CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH
IS A CATHOLIKE VISIBLE
CHURCH**

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VISIBLE CHURCH**

BY

Samuel Stone

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In a few places the Greek is uncertain, marked by double square brackets around the text. There is a reference to John 5:29 which is incorrect. The correct verse has double square brackets round it [[37]].

A
Congregational Church
Is a Catholike Visible Church.

OR
An Examination of M. *Hudson* his Vindi-
cation concerning the Integrality of the
Catholike Visible Church.

Wherein also satisfaction is given to what
M. CAWDREY writes touching that subject, in his
Review of M. HOOKER's Survey of Church Discipline.

By Samuel Stone, *Teacher to the Church of Christ at Hartford
in New-England.*

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To the READER.



N most Controversies, though in their issues and superstructures they rise to a marvelous height, yet in the beginning and bottom ground, the difference is not great. So in this, though the differences and contests, not so much of principles, as of spirits and persons; partly through inward corruptions and prejudices, together with the secret wrath of God for them; and probably also, through Jesuitical bellows, blowing these unhappy flames, are now grown to a woful height, to desperate distances and heart burnings; yet the foundation is in this seemingly slight Logical question, an Ecclesia instituta sit genus an integrum? Reverend and Learned M. Hudson conceives it to be totum integrale; M. Hooker to be totum universale. That this is the bottom question hence appears, that the other contrary apprehensions in Church discipline, are mostly the contrary consequences and deductions flowing from these two opposite principles.

Nor is it strange that so great a question in Divinity should border so neer upon the principles of Logick; for all the Arts are nothing else but the beams and rays of the Wisdom of the first Being in the Creatures, shining, and reflecting thence, upon the glass of man's understanding; and as from Him they come, so to him they tend: the circle of Arts is a Deo ad Deum. Hence there is an affinity and kindred of Arts (omnes Artes vinculo & cognatione quadam inter se continentur; Cicer. pro Arch. Poet.) which is according to the reference and subordination of their particular ends, to the utmost and last end: One makes use of another, one serves to another, till they all reach and return to Him, as Rivers to the Sea, whence they flow.

Now Logick is of most general use. Divinity. ratione finis; for it is the universal end of all: physica ratione $\chi\tau\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$; for every art riseth here: but Logick ratione $\chi\tau\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$; is most general; there is no art but useth the help of Logick; nothing can shew it self to the eye of the mind of man, but in this light. Hence mistakes in Logick are not unusual in Writers upon this subject. A man cannot apprehend M. Hooker's double consideration of the Church, as totum essentialia & organicum; nor why as totum essentialia it is Ecclesia prima, if he do not know genus and integrum and argumentum primum and ortum in Logick; nor judge his method to be other then leaping, if he do not

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know

know the method of the first part of Logick. Nor will his proving that Christ gave the Keys to a Visible Church, entitle the Church of Boston, or any other Church to them, unless it be also proved, that the visible Church is a genus, and that every individual Church, as that of Boston, is a species or part of this genus: Nor will it ever appear whether the visible Church be genus or integrum, till it appear what genus and integrum be.

Hence the first part of this Discourse is taken up in clearing the nature of these and other Logical Notions: which cannot but be needful in this question, for M. Cawdry was long troubled before he could find out M. Hooker's meaning, when he saith totum essentiale, not explaining it; though upon serious observation he found it. The Reader needs not be puzzled hereafter in that kinde, the explication is here done to his hand.

And here by the way I am to advertise the Reader that the publishing of this discourse may perhaps be a supersedias to any further labours, in answer to that reverend Divine. His review glanceth at some passages, not alwaies at the main and most material; when he shall strike at M. Hooker's whole frame and principles, he may receive an answer *κατὰ πόδας*; mean while this may suffice, meeting (though in pursuance of M. Hudson) with what seemes most material in the review.

The second part of this discourse improving and applying the grounds laid in the former to M. Hudson's discourse, would be wel attended by the Reader. Thou canst not judge aright till thou hast read the whole.

If any shall attempt a reply, let me desire him to imitate this, which may be a patterne for all discourses of this nature in clearness, and succinctness, and close pursuing the point in hand, without distastful reflections and diversions from things to men. Many polemical writers are so filled with oddpangs of their spirits, as causeth a secret kind of disrelishment and offence to the Readers.

The Author hereof is one who sees about him, understands the Principles and grounds he goes upon, and therefore knowes what he saith. His relation to M. Hooker (being Teacher of the same church) together with his personal abilities, caused many to judge him most meet to do this office of love to him and truth, but the fulness of his employments, in his constant preaching, and other ways, was a sufficient plea of excuse in his judgement in his not rendring an answer to M. Hudson's book; yet upon the earnest desire of a friend (who was then engaged for a Voyage to England) to have a few lines from him touching tho nature of a Catholike Visible Church (that being the first and main question betwixth M. Hooker and M. Hudson; viz. what totum the Visible Catholike Church is) he was induced to promise, that if he might but have a fortnight free from other service, he would (to satisfie the desire of his Friend)

Friend) send after him some Notes upon that subject; which accordingly was performed by him, and is done accurately and strongly, though briefly, as the streights of time allotted him would permit. It was in his thoughts to have given some larger explication concerning the nature and distinction of the Church, in such Propositions as these.

PROP. I. The church considered as the subject of Application, (where it is first to be attended) is the seed of Christ. As the seed of *Adam* is the subject of propagation, to whom his transgression is extended; so the seed of the second *Adam* are the proper subject of redemption, to whom it is applied by his Spirit, *Isa.* 53. 10.

PROP. II. The church is either Militant or Tryumphant.

PROP. III. The militant church is the number of those to whom Christ is applied but in part, which is therefore wrestling with her spiritual enemies.

PROP. IV. The militant church is mingled with Tares, *i. e.* with such who only seem to be the seed of Christ, *Mat.* 23. 24. to 31. and *vers.* 37.

PROP. V. The militant church mingled with Tares, is distinguished into congregations, and is therefore accomodated with the rule of Ecclesiastical policie, *Ephes.* 2. 12.

PROP. VI. The word church used in the new Testament, suits most exactly with a congregational political visible church.

PROP. VII. The political visible church is distinguished in respect of the times thereof. It was first in a family, then in a nation, lastly among al nations.

PROP. VIII. The political visible church among all Nations, is properly called a catholike visible church.

It was also in his purpose, had there been time, to have given some reasons of his dissent from M. Hudson's apprehension, concerning the visible headship of Christ. It is most true, that Christ is head of the Church as God-man: It is also true, that Christ is visible according to his humane nature; but that is not conceived sufficient to render him the visible head of the visible church. Christ is head of the invisible church as God-man; Christ God-man is monarch of the world. But he is not the visible head of the invisible church, nor the visible monarch of the world. Christ hath a more special influence into his church by his spirit, but his spirit is invisible. Every invisible member of Christ in the world, is not a visible member, yet every invisible member is a visible man.

I am sorry to stay thee any longer in the porch; only there are three sad hindrances of light in these points 1. Pride. 2. Wisdom. 3. Prejudice. Let me therefore leave upon thy heart three words of advice, if ever thou wouldst see the beauty of the Lord in his Temple, and the way of his house, or get the blessing and good of this, or any other good help for that end.

1. *To be much in humiliation. It is a most remarkable passage of Ezekiel 43. 10. If they be ashamed of all that they have done, shew them the house, the fashion and forms thereof, all the ordinances and laws thereof, &c. Oh take heed there be not some unmortified unlamented secret lust to darken thine eyes from seeing these blessed truths of God. Dues ineffabili lege spargit poenales caecitates super illicitas cupiditates (August. Confess.) It would make one tremble to see how dreadful the revenges of God whether for personal pollutions or for sinful compliances with the former devices and ways of men in the things of his house, or for secret contempt of the simplicity and power of* Review, c. 2. pag. 64. *the Gospsl, are gone forth in penal blindnesses and other blasting strokes upon the souls of some in these times: They that will not see the visions of their own hearts, and of the secret distempers, and sins, and plagues there, mourning also for them; God will not let them see the visions of himself, and of his power and glory in his Sanctuary; They shall ask the way to Sion weeping, Jer. 50. 4, 5. going, and weeping as they go.*

2. *Be not over wise, plainly thus; Seek not to accomodate the government of the Church to the wisdom and policy of Civil Governments amongst men. We see that crookning the Gospel to the unpurged relicks of the wisdom of Nature, hath been the ancient plague and seduction of Arminians; Let not the same distemper pervert thy thoughts in this matter. To conceive there are some reserved cases for Christ himself to come in almightily by his owne especial guidance, to over-rule in particular Congregations, as he hath done in that way of advice; why is not this as safe, as to place the help in appeals and classical subordinations, where the same objection returns at last as strong as ever: For if the National or General Council wrong a man, as they have often done, there is no relief for him upon earth. That that's useful in Civil Courts and Iudicatories, as Appeals may be, is ever hurtful and pernicious in Church discipline, if not commanded by Christ, but prudentially taken up.*

3. *Beware of prejudices against the way and works of God.*

1. *Against the way, Therefore I make the same request with Bucer in another case, ut pari studio legas utriusq; partis scripta. M. Brightman conceives from. Rev. 17. 3. that some faithful ones in a wilderness shall make the most full discovery of the mysterie of iniquity in all its abominations; clariorem adhuc lucem solitudo dabit, haud veniet e deserto nova ignominia &c. which words might have been lookt upon as trifles, had they dropt from some idle Pen, but not from his. It is certain, the practise of the Churches in New-England gives light enough to clear the Congregational way from the most of those misprisions and injurious misrepresentations that are cast upon it. Their consultation Synod in the opinion time, was blest of* God

God for their conviction, and clearing the Country of them, no lesser then if the Synod had assumed the highest jurisdiction. The mischievous consequences and sad effects which are alledged, are either meer mistakes and misreports in matter of fact, or fallaciæ non causæ pro causa, they rise not from the Congregational Principles. Either come unprejudiced in thy inquiries and searches after truth, or thou wilt never find it.

2. *Against the works of God, which do certainly speak something both in England and Scotland to such as have hearing hearts, and are not espoused to any Interest. How precious the Liberties of his people are to him, who hath bought them with his own blood, hath never been more abundantly and eminently discovered then in the dreadful changes and revolutions of Providence in these Nations, and in these days wherein we live. The Lord Iesus is of late gone forth into the world, with jealousie for Sion, and with a great jealousie for Jerusalem, to still the enemy, and the avenger, to vindicate the cause and controversie of his people, and to break the yokes of her oppressors, that the Virgin of Israel may return to Sion, and be adorned with her Timbrels as in the days of old. This is the desirgne he hath in hand. And rather then men shall hinder him when he is on his way and upon the wing in his travels of love and glory to his people, he is pleased we see to break the mountaines in peeces when they stand in the way of his revenge and holiness, and to bath his sword in the blood of heathen, even of professing people. The Father of light enlighten and enable all the Saints to close with him, both in the way of his worship, and in the way of his works.*

Samuel Mather.

To

To my Reverend Dear Brother,
M. Samuel Stone,

Teacher of the Church at
HARTFORD.

HOw well (dear Brother) art thou called *Stone*?
As sometimes Christ did *Simon Cephas* own.
Ioh. 1. 42. A *Stone* for solid firmness, fit to rear
A part in *Zions* wall: and it upbear.
Iosh. 6 & Like *Stone* of *Bohan*, Bounds fit to describe,
18. 17. 'Twixt Church and Church, as that 'twixt Tribe and Tribe.
I Sam. 7. 12. Like *Samuel's Stone*, erst *Eben-Ezer* hight;
To tell the Lord hath helpt us with his might.
I Sam. 17. 49, Like *Stone* in *Davids* sling, the head to wound
50. Of that huge Giant-Church, (so far renownd)
Hight at the Church-Catholike, Oecumenical,
Or at the lowest compass, National;
Yet Poteck, Visible, and of such a fashion,
As may or Rule a world or Rule a Nation.
Which though it be cry'd up unto the Skys,
By Philistims and Isralites likewise;
Yet seems to me to be too neer a kin
Unto the Kingdom of the *Man of sin*:
In frame, and state, and constitution,
Like to the *first beast* in the *Revelation*.
Rev. 13. Which was as large as Roman empire wide,
And Ruled *Rome*, and all the world beside.
Go on (good Brother) Gird thy Sword with might,
Fight the Lord's Battels, Plead his Churches Right.
To Brother *Hooker*, thou art next a kin,
By Office-Right thou must his pledge Redeem.
Take thou the double portion of his spirit,
Run on his Race, and then his Crown inherit.
Now is the time when Church is militant,
Time hast'neth fast when it shall be Tryumphant.

JOHN COTTON.

A Congregational Church, is a Catholike
Visible Church.



IN this disquisition I shall attend two things;

First, the explication of some Rules concerning Genus, or *Totum Genericum*.

Secondly, The Application of those rules to the question in hand.

In the Explication, I shall labour briefly to open the Fundamental Rules concerning *genus* and *species*; and then build some conclusions upon those Foundations, or deduce some Consectaries from those Principles.

In the Application, I shall return some answer to M. *Hudson's* Arguments contained in his fourth chapter; and also propound some reasons tending to demonstrate, that *A Congregational Church is a Catholike Church*.

CHAPTER I.

Concerning the Definition of Genus and Species.

G*enus est totum partibus essentielle.*

The General, or the Kind, or the general kind, is a whole essential to the parts.

Aristotle saith, it is that which is one and the same in more: that is, in more *species*. He hath other expressions to the same purpose; *viz.* that, the *genus* is that, whereby those that differ are the same according to Essence; that is, have community of Essence: which is the same in substance with this definition which I have here propounded; *viz.* That *Genus* is a whole essential to his parts.

ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
ἐπὶ πλεόνων,
Aristot.

There is another definition of genus, which *Aristotle* gives, and his followers have received from him, which M. *Hudson* hath taken up; *viz.*

Genus est totum quod de pluribus specie differentibus, potest prædicari in quid; or affirmari in questione, quid est. That is, the Genus is a whole, which may be predicated or affirmed of more things differing in special kind, in the question, what is it? It is said to be predicated in *quid*, because when the question is, what is the *species*? the *genus* then must be predicated of it, in answer to it: As when the question is,

M. *Hudson*
pag. 77.

what is *homo*? what is man? the answer must be, *Animal*, a living Creature.

This last definition is not exact;

First, Because *Genus* containeth not the whole quiddity of the thing: for when this answer is given, Man is a living creature; there is yet no difference appearing between him and a beast; a beast is a living creature: and the question yet remaineth what living creature he is.

Secondly, It is the proper office of the definition, to explicate the quiddity of a thing, and shew what it is. *Definitio est cum explicatur quid res sit*: when the utmost bounds of the Essence of a thing are laid forth, it is then distinguished from all other things.

Thirdly, There may be *genus* where no question is made.

We shall speak somewhat briefly, tending to open the true definition of *genus*. In which we may consider, first, the thing defined; secondly, the definition.

The thing desired is

Genus] the kind or general. The word firstly and properly signifieth a Stock, Linage, Parentage, Kindred, or Family. *Genus* is used in this signification in *Acts* 4. 6. where γένους is translated (and properly) Kindred: *And as many as were of the kindred of the high Priest*. *Phil.* 3. 5. Paul was ἐκ γένους ἰσραήλ *of the stock of Israel*.

Here it is taken for kind, community of Nature and Essence; As *animal* is the *genus* of Man and Beast; because the essence of living creature is common to both.

The word is translated from Families hither, by reason of similitude; because as Parents are causes of their children, so *genus* is of his *species*. And because those that are born in the same Family, and are of the same house, stock or kindred, have all things in common between themselves, as names, surnames, priviledges, &c. so in like manner *species* have a like nature in common between them; as *Socrates* and *Plato*.

The Definition is

Est totum partibus essentielle.

Genus est] *Genus* is; that is, it exists *extra Intellectum*, without the Understanding; There are universals as well as singulars, and common nature as well as special. There is a generality, universality, and community, and common nature of things, *me non cogitante*. Our understanding doth not give being to *genus*, but it is extant, and in print in *rerum naturâ*, whether we observe it or not.

Totum] a whole. This is the general nature of it, wherein it agreeth with *Integrum*. It is *totum*, a whole, because it is distributed into parts, and is the container of the parts. It is true, that there is more in the *species* than

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in the *genus*; yet the *genus* holds them together: All the parts are held together in the whole, as in the common head to which they are reduced. They all agree and meet together in the *genus*, in one common matter, and a common form, as in one point or center.

As Animality is a common *Vinculum* and Bond, containing and comprehending man and beast; they cannot but agree in that common nature, and so far they must needs agree one with another; that bond will bind them and hold them together while they have any existence or being in the world. There will be kindred and community of nature between *homo* and *brutum*, while the world stands.

Essentiale] It is a *totum* which gives essence: herein it is opposed to *Integrum*, for there the parts did give essence, matter, and form to the *Integrum*. We must not conceive that *genus* gives his community, generality, or universality to his *species*; nor that it gives to the *species* all that they have: there is more in the *species* than is in the *genus*; therefore the whole essence of the *species* is not in the *genus*. *Homo* hath a special form, which *Animal* hath not; *Homo est Animal rationale*: here is something in man besides his animality, which is added to it. It is true in this respect, *plus est in specie quàm in genere*; yet *genus* is *totum essentialie*; because it symbolically containeth the causes of the *species*, and *species* answerably the effects of the *genus*. *Genus* is not a *causarum essentialium communiū*; and imitates exactly the nature of those causes: as an essential cause argueth his effect, so *genus* argueth his *species*. Hence.

1. *Genus* gives *esse* to his *species*, as every cause to his effect: the *species* had never been, if it had not been for *genus*: *Sublato genere, tollitur species*, take away *animal*, and *homo* will not be; there will be no man in the world. *Homo* gives being to *Socrates*, and *Socrates* will not be, cannot be without *homo*: and as *Rachel* said, *give me children, or else I dy*; so *genus* saith, give me *species*, or else I dy. *Posito genere, necessariò ponitur aliqua species*. If *homo* be in the world, there will be *John*, *Thomas*, or some other Individuals or *species* of that kind.

2. The *genus* communicates matter and form to his parts; as the parts did give matter and form to the *Integrum* so the *genus* gives matter and form to the *species*; because it is a note of the common essential causes, which are matter and form; it therefore gives matter and common form to the *species*.

3. The *genus* communicates his whole essence to his *species*, his whole matter and form: Though it doth not bestow upon the *species* all which they have, yet it is so free-hearted, that it bestoweth his whole essence and nature, and all that it hath within it self, upon the *species*: Hence the whole essence of the *genus* is in the *species*, his whole matter and form; as whole animality

the whole matter and form of living creature is *in homine & Bruto*, in man and beast. There is nothing in the *genus* (besides his universality) which is not in the *species*. Humanity with his whole matter and form is in *Socrates* and *Plato*.

4. The *genus* communicates the same essence to all his *species*. It is a note of the common essential causes, and therefore imparts it self impartially and equally to every one of his *species*, is common to all, all have one and the same common nature in them. The same common humane nature is in *Socrates*, *Plato*, and all Individuals.

Paribus essentialibus] essential to its parts; *Totum est majus qualibet sua parte*; the whole containeth the single parts, as greater then any one of them, but containeth all, as being equal to them.

There is no *totum* consisting of one part; though the entire nature of the *genus* be in every *species*, yet not the universal nature: *Totum genus, non est nisi in cunctis speciebus*; one *species* cannot make up a *genus*: *Animal* was not made up compleat, and perfect, till *homo* was created.

We have finished the explication of the definition of *genus*, the kind; and have heard how kind it is (if I may so speak) to all his *species*: We must now declare briefly what respect *species* beareth to *genus* in taking his part.

Species est pars generis] The *species* is a part of its kind; the special is a part of the general.

Species] of the old verb *Specie*, to see or behold: It signifieth properly the outward face. countenance, or a sight (*non tulit hanc speciem*, he could not abide to see that sight) a thing seen or looked upon. *Græce*, εἶδος, & ἰδέα, of εἶδῶ, *video*, to see: It signifieth a visible shape, fashion, shew, appearance, image, or representation; τὸ εἶδος τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ ἕτερον, *the fashion of his Countenance was altered*; Luke 9. 29. οὐτὶ εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἑώρακατε, *neither have ye seen his shape*. Joh. 5. 29[[37]]. the same word is translated *appearance*, 1 Thes. 5. 22.

The reason of the name is, because the *genus* is seen in the *species*, in them it appeareth and sheweth his face.

Species est] the *species* is; that is, really existing in nature. The *genus* subsists in his *species*, and no where else; it is no where else to be seen or found: *Homo* is not to be seen but in *Socrates*, or *Plato*, *Alexander*, or some other Individuals which are his *species*. The *genus* being granted, doth necessarily imply the existence of the *species*.

Pars] a part is that which is contained of the whole; it is held together with some other part by the *genus*, and hath alwaies some fellow or other: for the *genus* cannot be divided into one part, but into several parts, a *species*

is but one piece of it. If *genus* be the whole, a *species* is a part; if *animal* be the whole, *homo* is a part.

Pars generis] non integri: Hereby it is distinguished from *membrum*, for that respects the integral, but *species* stands in reference to the *genus*, and participates of his essence, together with other *species*. *Aristotle* gives the same definition of it. *Cicero* saith, it is *pars quæ generi subest*: It is *pars generis subjectiva, sub icitur generi in ordine & gradu descensionis*. As man and beast are comprehended under *animal*, as inferiour to *animal* contained under that head: *animal* is before *homo*, and above him in order of nature; those *species*, viz. *Homo* and *Brutum* are cast under *animal*, as a more general head of Beings. 2. The *species* is subject to the *genus* in predication; make an axiome of *genus* and *species*, and we shall see the *species* to be the subject more often then the *genus*; as *homo est animal*, *Socrates est homo*.

CHAPTER II.

Concerning the distribution of Genus and Species.

G*enus est generalissimum aut Subalternum]* The *Genus* is most general, or subalterne.

The *Species* is subalterne, or most special,

The *Genus* is distributed into two kinds; most general, and subordinate: the *species* is also divided into two kinds; intermediate, or most special. God hath ranked things in order, that there is a subordination of things one to another, and one under another. There must be extrems on either side, something highest, something lowest; a most general, and a most special; and some between both. The subalterne *Genus* and *Species*, as they stand in respect to their superiours, they are *Species*; as they respect their inferiours, they are kinds, or generalls: that is, they receive their essence from their superiours, and communicate it to their inferiours. As man receiveth his essence from *Animal*, a living creature, and therefore is said to be his *Species*: and again he communicates his essence with singular men; whence he is called their *Genus*.

The highest *Genus* is most general; the lowest *Species* is most special; the intermediate kinds, which come between these, are the *Genus* of their inferiours and the *Species* of their superiours; which by reason of this vicissitude and changing, by courses and turns, are called subalterne,

Genus generalissimum est cujus nullum est Genus.

The most general *Genus* is that of which there is no *Genus*.

Genus Generalissimum] the most general *Genus* (which in Greek is called *κενοικώτατον καὶ πρῶτον*), the most general, and the first) It is that which hath none more general going before it, but is the Prime and first *Genus* of all.

It

It is called the most General kind, because it is the supream and highest kind, which never descends, but always keeps the highest ranke, and can be nothing but *Genus*. *Subalternum Genus* is not onely and always *Genus*; but *Generalissimum* is only and always *Genus*.

Genus Generalissimum est] there is a most general *Genus*, *Est enim quoddam in suo genere in qualibet arte supream*, there is something which is highest in every art; as argument in invention. Look also how many arts there are, so many supream kinds there are. If God hath ordered and disposed things by certain degrees one above another, there must be something supream and highest, which is the most general kind.

Cujus nullum est Genus] of which there is no *Genus*: this being the highest, hath no *Genus* above it, and therefore hath no *Genus* at all, and in never *Species*. It is *supream in suo genere non datur processus in infinitum*, there cannot be an infinite motion and procession in *Creatures*; *Ergo standum est in aliquo primo*: we must rest in some first, and highest thing. Art in general is the *Genus* of all the special Arts; and *Ens* the most general *Genus* of all beings.

The subaltern *genus*, as also the subaltern *species*, is that which is the *species* of one, but the *genus* of another. All things comming between the supream *genus*, & *species infima*, are subaltern kinds and *species*. This is the forme of subaltern *genus* and *species*; to be *genus* in respect of inferiours, and *species* in respect of superiour, and higher things: the same thing cannot be a *species* in respect of superiour and inferior, no more the *Alexander* can be son and Father to the same *Philip*; *Subalternum genus & species* may be the same, differing only in a respect; and therefore one definition may serve both: *genus potest esse species, quia potest esse pars Generis*; It may be a part of a *genus* which is above it; and *species* may be *genus*, because it may be *totum partibus essentielle* to his inferiours which are under it. Cause is a *species* to *argumentum absolute consentaneum*, but a *genus* to matter and forme.

Species specialissima est, quæ est Individua in alias species.]

The most special *species* is that which cannot be divided into other *Species*.

Species specialissima] the most special, the lowest *species*.

Est] is; *Est enim quoddam infimum in naturâ*; there is something lowest: as there is a highest, above which we cannot ascend; so there is a lowest, beneath which we cannot descend. We must proceed from the highest by the intermediate, to the lowest, and there rest.

Qui est Individua in alias species] which cannot be divided into other *species*] We may divide it into members, but we cannot divide it into any lower *species*: there cannot be lower then the lowest. As *genus generalissimum*

mum hath no *genus* above it; so *species specialissima* hath no *species* under it; it is perpetually a *species*, and never a *genus*: It always takes his essence from his superiours, but never communicates it with inferiours; because it hath nothing beneath it, into which it may be distributed. Singular men take their essence from *homo* as their *genus*, but never communicate it to inferiours; for there is nothing inferiour to those singulars. Thus this singular matter, and this singular form are most special *species*: and *Socrates*, *Plato*, and all individual men, are most special *species*; which is individual into other *species*. This is that which is commonly called *individuum*, an individual.

That every Individual is a *species*, I shall labour to demonstrate when we come to the consecratories. To make way for this especially, I have touch'd briefly upon the distribution of *genus* and *species* in this Chapter.

CHAPTER III.

Wherein is propounded certain Corollaries, or consecratories, deduced and flowing from the explication of Genus and Species.

First from the explication of *genus*, there is a double consecratory. That *genus* doth partly agree with *Integrum*, and partly dissent from it. It agrees with it, because it is *totum*; It dissents from it, because it is *Totum partibus essentielle*.

First we shall therefore speak to their agreement in several conclusions.

The first conclusion concerning the agreement of *totum universale*, and *totum integrale*,

Totum universale, & *totum integrale*, the universal, and integral whole, are both immutable in *Actu signato* (if I may so speak) and mutable in *Actu exercito*: They are both signed with an immutable and unchangeable rule and definition; but are changeable in the particulars. The english is, the rules concerning these are eternal and immutable; but the special examples are mutable, fluxile and variable. Here Mr *Hudson* is mistaken, for he makes immutability an affection of *genus*; and mutability a property of *integrum*. His words (p. 81.) are, *that totum which is mutable and fluxile, is an integrum; for a genus is immutable, constant, permanent, æternæ veritatis.*

Answer, It is true that *genus* is immutable in *Actu signato*; and it is as true, that *integrum* is immutable, constant, permanent, *æternæ veritatis*. For every rule of art is eternally true, and without possibility of being false; being all the rules of the eternal wisdom of the first being. *Genus est totum partibus essentielle*, is an eternal immutable rule: *Integrum est totum cui partes sunt essentielles*, is likewise an eternal and standing rule, incapable of mutation. The rules concerning mutable things are immutable. I cannot con-

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cur with M. Hudson (p. 79.) in his definition of *totum integrale*. His words are these. *Quod habet partes extra partes est totum integrale, Sed ecclesia visibilis universalis habet partes extra partes, ergo.* The major is the very definition of *totum integrale*. Answ. How can that be the very definition of *totum integrale*, when *genus habet partes extra partes*? Socrates, Plato, Paul, &c. are *species*, and therefore *partes hominis*, and yet are not one within another, but different one from another.

But take any example of *genus* or *integrum*, and both are mutable; For all kinds of things in this inferiour world are mutable Those kinds of things that live a springing life are corruptible; and so are those kindes of beings which live the life of sense. The whole kind of trees, and the whole kind of brute beasts shall utterly perish at the last. In this respect *totum genus plantarum & brutorum*, are mutable and fluxile. Man is now of a shorter life then he was before the flood; I speak of man as *genus hominum*, of man in general. Hence that rule which Mr Hudson propounds is not true, *viz.* That *totum* which is mutable and fluxile, is an integral. For Tree-kind and Brute-kind are mutable and fluxile, and yet neither of them is an integral, but each of them is a genus.

CONCLUSION II.

Totum genericum & integrale are both of them *argumenta orta*: arguments arising and springing from the first as their root; being derived from thence, as streams from their Fountain, and children from their Parents,; resembling and representing their nature. They are as the image and shadow of the first, symbolically, tacitely, and secretly comprehending the prints and footsteps of those first arguments, wearing their badge and livery. These having the force of the first communicated to them, argue as they in respect of their force and affection of arguing, but in a new way and manner, as second notions at the second hand: look what force the cause hath to argue its effect, the same force hath an argument arising from the cause to argue the symbol of the effect. As the matter and forme argue their effect, so the members argue the *integrum*.

Hence it appears, that *genus* is not *causa materialis*, as Mr Hudson pag. 78. judgeth; for this he speaks of it; as it doth exist in the individual, it is *causa materialis individui*.

Answ. *Genus* is not *causa materialis*, or *materia*; for that is a first argument deriving this force of arguing from no other. It is *symbolum materiae*; not as it relates to *genus* (as Mr Hudson there speaks) but as *genus*: for *genus* relates not *genus*.

2. Hence it also appears, that Mr Hudson pag. 78. is mistaken in conceiving that the *genus* only is a second notion, and that thereby it is distinguished from

from the integral. The *genus* being a second notion: and also in the same page, *But Universality is of another nature, being an abstract second notion,*

Answ. It is true, *genus* is a second notion; but it is not thereby distinguished from *integrum*; for that is a second notion, arising from some first argument.

CONCLUSION III.

Genus and *integrum* are both capable of admission and ejection of parts. That is not a true rule which Mr *Hudson* pag. 81. propounds. *That totum whereunto there is admission, wherein there is nutrition and edification, and out of which there is ejection, that is an integral: his meaning is, it is not genus.*

Answ. That *totum* may be a *genus*; for *animal* admitted beast and man at the first under his wing: when a man is born and admitted into the world, he is admitted into mankind: when an individual lyon comes into the world, he is admitted into lyon-kind: when *Bucephalus* was foaled, he was admitted *genus equorum*, and was nourished, &c. and when he dyed, he was ejected and cast out of that kind: when an individual lyon dyes, he is excommunicated from lyon-kind. All beasts at the last shall be excommunicated, and cast out of the society of *animal*, a living creature. When a Scholler is admitted into a Colledge and University, he is admitted into a new kind of society, where he is nourished and edified in good literature: when he is expelled from thence, he is cast out of that kind of society. The reason is, because there is no individual integral corporation or society, but is of some kind or other.

CONCLUSION III.

There is a reciprocation between the whole and the parts. Although the parts are not the whole, yet they are adaequate and equal to the whole. This rule belongs to distribution and definition; *In quâ utraq; affectio reciprocationis est, illic partium omnium cum toto, hîc definitionis cum definito.* The whole contains just as much as the parts, and the definition as the definite: & *contrâ partes simul sumptæ*, are equal to the whole, neither more nor less; they will reach as far as the whole, and no farther; and the whole will extend it self as far as all the parts, and no farther. They are like vessels holding the same measure, of equal latitude and extent, one as large as the other; as two pints, and a quart. Having the whole, you have all the parts; and having the parts you have the whole. *Omnis divisio debet exhaurire totum divisum.* But one part alone is narrower, and reacheth not so far as the whole: this reciprocation is *partium omnium cum toto*; not of any one. For if one part alone were equal to the whole, all the parts together were greater then the whole. But that is a clear standing everlasting rule, that the whole is
greater

greater then the part; that is, then any one part. And this being a property of *totum*, as such, is true of *totum universale*, and *integrale*.

1. Of *Totum universale*. The *genus* is greater then any any one *species*; *homo* is greater or larger then *Socrates*; and *Animal* larger then *homo*. The *totum genus*, the whole *genus* is not in every part or *species*; the generality or universality of the *genus*, is not in every *species*; humanity universally considered in the whole latitude and extent of it, is not in *Socrates*. The reason is, because genus is totum a whole; and *species est pars generis*: the *species* is but a part of the genus. Genus gives it self to be divided among all his *species*, but gives not it self wholly and altogether to any one *species*. It is a whole containing many or several parts, and is not wholly or universally in one part or species. There is but a part of the *genus* in one *species*; and therefore when we say *Socrates est homo*, *Socrates* is a man; we mean not that he alone is a man: for then *Socrates* should be genus, giving and communicating essence to his *species*, which cannot be: *tota humanitas & universa*, all humanity universally considered, is not in *Socrates*: for part of humanity is in Plato, &c. it is proper to genus to be *totum universale*, this cannot belong to any part: the genus is of larger and wider extent then any one *species*; *Animal* extends it self beyond *Brutum*, and comprehends *Homo* also within its compass.

Quest. *When Brutum was made, and not Homo; where was Animal? When brute beasts were made, and not man; where was living creature.*

Answ. *Animal*, living creature, that *genus* or kind was still in making, and not perfect till *Homo* was made,

2. It is as true of *totum integrale*; All the members are equal to the whole, but not any one. Hence an *integrum*, an entire thing, cannot have his whole integral entire nature preserved in one part or member.

Mr Hudson affirmeth, that *the Catholike integral Church*, i. e. the Church Catholike, which he affirms to be an integral, *may be brought into a narrow room, and haply to one congregation; it is possible*: (saith he in p. 88.) *yet all the essence and priviledges of the Church Catholick Visible, are contracted and reserved therein*. This position is as cross to reason, as that one is two or three; *integrum* cannot be made of one member; for all the members give essence, and being to the integral. A part, cannot be the whole; the eye cannot be the whole body; 1 Cor. 12, 17. *If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole body were hearing, where were the smelling?* v. 18. *But now, God hath disposed the members every one of them in the body, at his own pleasure.* v. 19. *For if they were all one members, where were the body?* v. 20. *But now are there many members, but one body.* A mutilated, and maimed body, cannot be a perfect and entire body.

M. Hudson

M. *Hudson* will not affirm that a City may be preserved entire in one members; for a City contains many Citizens: there cannot be πόλις, of πολὺς; *multus*, where there is but one man. M. *Hudson* consents to this, that the nature of a flock is not reserved in one sheep; or a Corporation in one man; or that a swarm of Bees cannot be in one Bee. *Integrum* is not made of one member, as M. *Hooker* chap. 15. pag. 26. speaks. I wonder to what end M. *Hudson* speaks of a flock and a sheep; which are *Integrum* and *membra*; when he would shew that the whole nature of the *genus* is not in *una specie*.

CONCLUSION V.

Genus and *Integrum* are both existing, and measurable by time and place. I find M. *Hudson* clearly and fully expressing his judgement, that *Genus* doth not exist, and that it is not measurable by time and place: I shall present some of his expressions concerning this business, to the Reader; *viz.* in page 78. he saith, *Universality is of another Nature, being an abstract second Notion*. And again in the same page he hath these words; *Genus being a second Notion, existeth not; but in intellectu nostro: habet fundamentum in rebus, non existentiam; for as it doth exist, it is an integral, and loseth his abstract nature, wherein the Universality doth consist*. And again in page 88. *Genus is a notion not existing*. I shall name but one place more, in page 81. where he expresseth himself in these words; *That Totum which is measured by time and place, is an Integral; for Genus which is a notion, is capable of neither of them*. By which, &c. it appears, that M. *Hudson* apprehends that this is one main difference between *genus* and *integrum*: that *genus* is a notion not existing, nor measurable by time and place; but *integrum* exists, and is measured by time and place.

Answ. I conceive and affirm, that both of them (*genus* as well as *integrum*) are existing things, measured by time and place; and that both of them shew their faces in *rerum Naturâ*; and that the Understanding finds neither of them lurking or lying hid in the bottomless pit of non existence. The existence of *integrum* is so palpable and plain, that M. *Hudson* hath no scruple about it, suspects it not in the least measure, but gives in his clear Testimony concerning the existence of it; that he hath seen it standing out from all his causes, and that time and place have taken measure of it, or at least are able to do it; he affirms that it is measurable by both. Only I conceive that he offers some wrong and indignity to *genus*, to deny it the same privilege. We shall therefore plead, (so far as the laws of Logick, and ancien statutes of reason will give in evidence for us) and labour to demonstrate, that existence is a privilege duly belonging to *genus*; and that he cannot be denied it in the Court of Argumentation, without the violation of the rules of reason.

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In the touching or handling this cause, we shall speak some things, First, By way of Explication; Secondly, By way of Confirmation of the Truth. The Question being stated, we shall give the Explication in several Propositions.

PROPOSITION I.

Second Notions are as real as first Notions: *Argumenta orta* are as real as *prima*: arising Arguments are as real, true existing things, as the very first Arguments from whence they arise; and have as real a Being and Entity as they. *Adam* was the first man, but all his sons are true men as well as himself: So those Arguments which arise and spring from the first, as their Ancestors or Predecessors, are real Things or Beings, as well as their Parents, from which they descend. Those which some call Nominal (because the force of Arguing is in the name) yet have a reality in them, and are not meer fictions; but here the force of Arguing lieth in the things themselves. Definition is not a first Argument, but is beholding to the first Arguments for his Birth, Nativity, and Breeding; and hath derived his whole Existence and Being from them; and yet is not a meer Notion, crept into the Understanding of man, before it was duely entred and enrolled into the Artificial Fabrick of Reason; which is one of those *Vestigia* and Impressions which the first Being hath left behind him. Those who read in the great book of the world, and turn over those leaves and volumes, may find the explication of the quiddity, and being of things, or the bounds of their being unfolded; which is nothing else, but their definition. E. Gr. *homo est animal rationale*, a man is a reasonable creature: this is the definition of man. Men and angels could never make this to be the definition of man, but find it made before their eyes; they gather it up with the hands of their understandings; which they could never have gathered, if there had been no such fruit growing in the garden of nature, or in *artificio rei*. *Totum integrale* is listed in the number of arising arguments, being a symbol of the effect: and yet is never so much as charged or accused by M. *Hudson*, or any other (that I have heard) for non-reality or non-existence. We have gained thus much already in pleading the cause of *genus*, that his ortive or derivative nature is no prejudice at all to his real being, and existence. We cannot deny, but that the impressions of other second notions, have been extant many thousands, of years; and what reason have we (if we desire to deal impartially) to say, that *genus* is not extant, because it is a second notion? For my part, I cannot deny but that it is come abroad in the world, as the impression of the first being, who is author, *entium & artium*, unless I had some spleen against this more then against other second notions; to which this (if it may have its right) is not inferiour.

PROPOSITION II.

PROPOSITION II.

Abstractio vel' Αφάιρεσις est sejunctio [[Πραττομεύου]]. The abstraction of the [[Πρατόμευον]], is that whereby the understanding can separate, and sever the arts one from another, that are confounded in the [[Πρατόμευον]]; which is *opus motu artis factum*. As a Geometrician can take magnitude (length, breadth and thickness) from a body in conceit; that is, he can understand those dimensions which are found only in material things, not considering or looking at the matter. This abstraction is common to all Arts, there is the impression of all Arts in the things; and one may abstract the workmanship of one Art from the workmanship of another Art. As suppose seven Artificers have bin at work in building a Ship; the Carpenter, Smith, Glasier, &c. a man by his understanding may sever the work of the Glasier, or the work of the Smith, from the work of the Carpenter, &c. The first being (having all arts in himself) hath left an impression of them in the frame and building of the world; and here a man by his understanding may sever the fabrick of one Art from another. When a man looks upon a Tree, by the eye of Logick, he may abstract, and draw away the *artificium logicum* from it; he looks upon it as bringing forth fruit; and in that respect he sees a cause and effect there; as it is of such a colour or quantity, he sees a subject there; as it is placed in such an Orchard, he sees it as an adjunct; as it contains root, body, and branches, he finds integrum and membra there; as it is a Vine, Fig-tree &c. He finds *genus* and *species* there, &c. The Philosopher looks at the *artificium physicum*: the Grammarian looks at the word, &c. The Arichmetician at the number, &c. This abstraction is nothing but severing the work and artifice of one art from that of another, in my understanding; not considering the other frames that are there growing together with it.

As there is an abstraction of the work of one Art from the work of another; so there is also an abstraction of some part or piece of the work of one Art, from other parts and pieces of the work of the same Art growing together with it in the same frame. One may abstract the workmanship of a Carpenter appearing in the frame of the windowes made by him, and look upon that piece of his art, without consideration of the rest of the building, or any other part of it. So here I can abstract the consenting, arguments from the rest in my consideration, or I can leave them, and consider the arising arguments; as the *genus*, definition, &c. And this abstraction is not a real separation of those arguments and affections from the things, but only a mental separation, whereby a man sees a thing distinct from another, and looks upon it alone distinctly. I can consider the nature of a thing in the abstract, that never subsists by it self but in the concrete. As I can take colour from a body coloured (although no colour can subsist alone by it self) and consider

that quality alone by it self in its own nature, without consideration of the subject, in which this quality is inherent. So likewise we may abstract moisture from the ayre, and consider it only in its own nature, as a quality whereby a thing is ready to flow out of its own bounds, and to take the figure of another thing. Lastly, thus we may abstract humanity from *Socrates, Plato, &c.* and conceive the idea of it in our minds, without the consideration of *Socrates, Plato, &c.*

PROPOSITION III.

The abstraction of a logical notion from the thing, is no prejudice to its existence: when a man by the rule of Geometry abstracts magnitude from a body, in his mind; it followes not from hence, that there is no magnitude existing in bodies; I can abstract moisture from the ayr, and consider it abstractively and sejurctively in its own nature; and yet there is moisture really existing in nature.

PROPOSITION III.

The abstraction of *genus*, or the general universal nature of things, from the things themselves, by mental consideration; is no argument to demonstrate the non-existence of *genus* and universals in *rerum naturâ*. The abstraction of heat from fire, or dryness from the earth, or a colour from a body coloured, *i. e.* the consideration of any of these in their own distinct nature, is no evidence that these things are not really existing in nature; so likewise, the abstraction of *genus* and universality, is no evidence against their real existence and being in nature; but a good argument (as we shall perceive presently) of their real entity, and that they are extant in *rerum naturâ*. Is there no colour really existing, because I can abstract it? the universality of things doth not consist in their abstract nature (as *M. Hudson p. 78.* conceives) as the quantity and quality of things consist not in their abstract natures; that is, they are not so, because I discern them; but they are existing, and therefore I discern them. I know not the reason why *Mr Hudson* should call the nature of things, their abstract nature: for the nature of things is the same, when they are not abstracted and discerned, and when they are taken into consideration by our understanding. Colours are the same seen or unseen: our apprehension cannot change the nature and property of things. I cannot assent to that notion of *Mr Hudson p. 78.* that as the *genus* exists, it loseth his abstract nature; for by that reason, nothing existing could be abstracted. I can consider the nature and definition of *integrum*, without the consideration of this or that integral; and yet *Mr Hudson* confesseth, that *integrum* is always existing.

PROPOSITION V.

The subsistence of universals in singulars, is no argument of their non-existence,

stence. Universals are subsistent in singulars; and *genus* subsists in individuals; as *animal* in *homine & bruto*; and *homo* in *Socrates, Alexander, Cicero, &c.* And we must look for *genus* in *individuis*, and there we shall find it; It is where individuals are. But this doth not argue and demonstrate, that it hath no real existence. Quantity and quality have no subsistence, but in their proper subjects; and yet there are such things really extant in the world. Colour, savour and odour, have no subsistence, but in mixt bodies; and yet are real things. There is such a thing as paternity existing in the world; and yet cannot subsist without Filiation; *integrum* is a real thing, and yet never subsists without his members. And as *integrum* hath his subsistence in his members, so *genus* in his individuals. As *integrum* is, where the members are; so *genus* is, where the individuals are. A flock is, where the sheep are, which are the members of that body. There cannot be the whole body without the head, hands, feet, or members of which it is made. So it is with *genus* and species: there cannot be *homo* without individuals, as *Socrates, Plato, &c.*

This seemeth rather to be an Argument, and demonstration of the real existence of universals: for how could they be in singulars, if they were not really existing? If quantity and quality are in their proper subjects; it is certain that there are such things in the world. So likewise, if universals are subsisting in singulars; it is most certain that there are such things in *rerum naturá*.

PROPOSITION VI.

Genus is capable of time, and place, and may be measured by both. This Mr *Hudson* p. 81. denyeth, but we affirme.

1. It is capable of time, and may be measured by it. The essence of a thing stands in the union of matter and form; the duration or continuance of the act of the forme upon the matter, or the holding together of the matter and form, is an adjunct of the essence: and this is time. *Continue, of
con & tenco,
to hold to-
gether .*

2. There is a duration of the matter and forme of individuals. The matter and forme of *Gabriel* have continued together above 5000. years.

3. *Gabriel*, and other individual Angels, have been existing in the world above 5000. years: his duration and theirs is measured by time.

4. Hence the *totum genus*, Angel-kind, the whole kind of angels were created in beginning of time, and have been in the world a certaine space of time; the duration of the whole kind is equal with the duration of the individuals, and is therefore measured by time. There was a time when there was no kind of inconstant natures in the world, *viz.* the sust 12. hours, when there was nothing but the third heaven, and the angels created; and the first matter, after that all the several sorts and kinds of things which were perfected

by degrees, came into the world in their order, successively one after another, all the kinds have continued in the world for many 1000 years. The existence of all these kinds is measured by time.

All these kinds also are measured by place; for where the individuals are, there are the kinds. All the individuals of every kind are in some place or other; and therefore it may be truly affirmed, that all kinds of things were seated in some place or other. The stars, the whole kind of them remain in the element of fire to this day. I conclude this proposition; The *genus* subsisting in individuals, which are in time and place, in that respect is it self also in time and place.

Having premised these things, we shall now state the question, and give some arguments for the confirmation of the truth.

That which is to be demonstrated, is, that *genus* is not a notion (as Mr Hudson p. 81. calls it) that is, a meer notion: we shall labour to prove that *genus* is not a meer notion floating only in the brain; it is not a meere fantasmie or fantastical thing, existing only in *intellectu nostro*, and no where else: but a real thing. *Universalia non sunt intentionalia, sed realia*; Universal things are real things, existing in nature, and *rebus ipsis*. That *genus* is existing in *rerum naturá*, may appear by these reasons.

1. Reason, Every artificial argument is in *rerum naturá*, existing really in nature:

Genus is an artificial argument;

Therefore *genus* is in *rerum naturá*.

The *Major* or first proposition is evident, for that is an artificial argument, which is in *artificio rei*: in the frame, fabrick, and nature of the thing immediately.

The *Minor* is also clear, that *genus* is an artificial argument: for it is either an artificial argument, or a testimony; but it is not a testimony: *ergo*. It argues not by an assumed force as a testimony, but in, and of it self. The *genus* is arguing and claiming an interest in his *species*, as parts of himself, before any man give testimony of it.

2. Reason, That which may be invented and found in *rerum naturá*, is in *rerum naturá*.

Genus may be invented and found in *rerum naturá*.

Therefore *genus* is in *rerum naturá*.

Invenire est in rem venire, to invent is to come in upon a thing: and it is impossible to finde a thing in nature, that is not there to be found. A man cannot find fruits or flowers growing in orchards or gardens where they never grew: nor mines of gold, in places where the Sun never made any. If *genus* were not in *fabrica rei*, in the frame of things; it could never be found

found there. *Genus* may be invented, for it is an argument in the first part of Logick, which is invention.

Reas. 3. That which may be abstracted from the things, is in *rerum naturâ*.

Genus may be abstracted from the things.

Therefore *genus* is in *rerum naturâ*.

That *genus* may be abstracted, is granted by Mr *Hudson*: and abstracted and drawn away it could not be, if it were never existing in the things. Men cannot gather grapes of thorns, or figges of thistles, where they never grew. If *genus* were not growing and springing up in the garden of nature, it could never be abstracted and drawn from thence by the consideration of our understandings. To abstract (as we have heard) is to see a thing distinct from another, that grows together with it in the frame. If magnitude were not really existing in a body, and adjoynd to it, it could never be abstracted from it by Geometry.

Reason, 4. Every *totum* whose parts are real things, really existing in nature, is it self in *rerum naturâ*.

Genus is a *totum*, whose parts are real things, really existing in nature;

Therefore *genus* it self is in *rerum naturâ*.

The first proposition is fair and rational; for there is a reciprocation of all the parts with the whole. The whole contains just as much as the parts; and it cannot contain so much as the parts, if the parts be full of entity and reality; and the whole be a vain thing, having no reality, or real entity, and being in it. If *genus* be a meer fantastical thing, and notion, which men have got in their crowns, it is an empty vessel, and holds no real entity at all; and then the parts must be empty. A vessel full of ayre or wind is empty, in comparison of that which is filled with water or precious liquor. If the *species* are real things, and the *genus* an empty notion, an empty vessel, how can it hold as much as the *species*? If that be an empty thing it pours out nothing but emptiness into the *species*; and they receive nothing but emptiness from it. Animal is as real a thing as *homo* and *brutum*: And *Homo* as real, as *Socrates*, or *Plato*.

The *minor* is most true, that *species*, especially the individual *species*, are real things. Mr *Hudson* will not deny, that *Peter*, *Abraham*, and *David* &c. are real things.

Reason, 5. That which gives and communicates real essence and being to other things, is in *rerum naturâ*.

Genus gives and communicates real essence, and being to other things;

Therefore *genus* it self is in *rerum naturâ*.

That which is a meer fantasie or fantastical thing, can give no essence.

How can that which is onely in the brain give essence? If it were onely mental, it could not give being; *Nihil dat, quod non habet*. It is a strange thing to conceive that a notion should sit in a mans understanding, and brood so many real things: all the *species* of things should then have a mighty dependance upon mens understanding: For upon this account, if there were no reasonable Creatures, having understanding to catch and hold this bird; it would imediately make use of its wings, and flee as an Eagle out of the world, and the compass of beings, and vanish into just nothing. All universalls would betake themselves to their flight, they would all take their leave. But if there should be but one rational creature produced in the world, they would come flocking in thick and threefold, and build their nests in his understanding; and being well seated there, would out of their emptiness pour out themselves as freely upon their *species*, and make them as real beings as ever they were.

Genus gives and communicates being to other things, *i. e.* to his *species*: for *genus est totum partibus essentielle*. The essential causes, which constitute the essence, are comprehended in the genus, and the forme. *Homo est animal rationale: Animal*, a living creature is essential to man: It containes part of the essence of man. For the definition layeth out all the essentiall causes.

Reason, 6. If there be a community of nature and kindred between beings, and general kinds of things in *rerum naturá*, *genus* is in *rerum naturá*,

But there is community of nature; and kindred between beings, and general kinds of things in *rerum naturá*;

Therefore *genus* is in *rerum naturá*.

I shut up diverse arguments in one, and conclude this question. I know no exception against either of the propositions. I see no ground to question the first: for what is in the *genus* but community of nature, and kindred between beings from the first? If therefore some special things have the same nature in common one with another; and if there be such neer affinity and kindred between beings; there is *genus* in *rerum naturá*. If there be general kinds of things, *varia genera rerum*, there must be *genus*; for what is *genus*, but the general kinde?

The *minor*, or second proposition may easily appear. What is more evident then this, that there is community of nature, a kindred between beings, and general kinds of things in nature? Constant natures, as Angels, have the same Angelical nature in common one with another, divided between them. The Elements have one common nature, being a kin, *i. e.* of the same general kinde one with another. So likewise have the Elementaries, which are made of them. All living things are of a kindred. Things that live the life of sense, are of a neere kindred: and those that live the life of reason, together with

with the life of sense, have a neer agreement of nature, and are neer a kin one to another. *Jam.* 3. 7. δεδάμασαι τῆ φύσει τῆ ἀνθρωπίνῃ: hath been tamed of the humane nature, or of mankind (as it is in our translation) which are both one for the substance: all mankind having the same humane nature in common. So also there is a kindred of Arts (as *Cicero* speaks: he affirms that) Poetry is a kin to Oratory; because all Arts have a common *Vinculum* and bond, and a certain kindred between them, by which they are contained, and held together, &c.

And that there are diverse general and special kinds of things in nature appears, *Gen.* 1. 11. 12, 21, 24. There are various kinds of trees, as a Vine, Fig-tree, &c. and several kinds of Apple-trees under that general kind. Several kinds of living creatures, Fishes, Birds, Beasts; and diverse sorts under one kind: under the general kind of beasts, there are Lyons, Horses, &c. who can reckon up their manifold kinds? There is Angel-kind, mankind, &c. All these kinds of things are real things: and all other kinds besides mankind, were come into the world and had a real being and existence before the understanding of man was created, and sitted to receive them. They could not exist then in *intellectu nostro*: where could they exist, but in *rerum natura*?

We have heard of the agreement; we are now to speak concerning the difference of *totum universale*, and *integrale*.

DIFFERENCE I.

The *genus* is a not of the causes; the *integrum* is a note of the effect: *genus* and *species* are notes of the causes and effects: and *integrum* and *membra*, are notes of the effect and causes. The *integrum* is a *Totum*, to which the parts are essential: they give essence, *i. e.* causes. The essential causes are the matter and form; therefore these parts give matter and forme to the whole. Every member gives a portion of matter and forme; and all members make up a common matter and forme of the whole: and of the matter and forme of every part, is made up the matter, and forme of the whole; the matter of the whole is made of the matter of the parts; and the forme of the forme of the parts.

And as these contain the matter and forme of the whole, so the *Genus* being essential to the parts, containeth the matter and common forme of the *species*. A perfect definition containes all the the essential causes of the thing, which are the matter and form, the general, and proper nature: the forme is exprest, and the matter is included in the *genus*, which containes the matter and common forme.

DIFFERENCE II.

The *Genus* communicates his whole essence, and his whole entire nature to the *species*. *Species habet naturam generis integram, non universam*. The

entire nature of the *genus* is in the *Species*: and in this respect, *tota natura generis conservatur in unâ specie*: All the entire nature of man was preserved in *Adam*; because the *genus* is essential to its parts: it communicates his whole entire essence to every one of them. It is not so in *integrum*; there the parts did give their essence to the whole, and not the whole to them. There therefore the rule is, *quicquid convenit membro, convenit integro*; because the members were essential to it. But the rule here is, *quicquid convenit generi, convenit speciebus*; because the *genus* is essential to them. And in this respect, *species recipit generis sui definitionem*: not in *actu signato*; the definition of the *genus* is not the definition of the *species*: we must not say *species est Genus*; but in *actu exercito*, (as I said) that is, take any example of *genus*, as *Homo* is *Genus* to his individuals: and here the definition of *homo* is communicated to *Peter*. Man is a reasonable creature; *Peter* is a man; therefore *Peter* is a reasonable creature. *Animal* is indued with sense, a lyon is *animal*; therefore a lyon is indued with sense.

Mr *Hudson* p. 79. doth somewhat dissent from this: his expressions are these. *Though it be said that tota natura generis conservatur in unâ specie*, and by this rule in uno individuo, *it must be fundamentaliter only*, non formaliter, *for there is no such universality formally in specie*, & multo minis in individuo. *I answer*, That I know no man who affirms that the universality of the *genus* is in *specie* formally; the universality is not there, but the entire nature of man is in *Socrate*, &c. the evidence which Mr *Hudson* brings for the demonstration of this, is, that the nature of an *integrum* cannot be preserved in one member: his words are, *as the nature of a flock is not reserved in one sheep, or a corporation in one man; to use Mr Hooker's own words*.

Answ. He useth Mr *Hooker's* own words indeed, for Mr *Hooker* disputes against Mr *Hudson*, and demonstrates clearly, that the nature of an *integrum* cannot be preserved in one member: but he professeth, that he yeilds that which all writers and rules confirme; that *tota natura generis conservatur in una specie*. If Mr *Hudson* can prove that *genus* & *integrum* are the same, his instances will serve to some purpose; otherwise they are propounded in vain; for a flock is an *integrum*; and so is a corporation: an individual sheep cannot be a flock; but an individual sheep hath the whole entire nature of a sheep in it: there is nothing in the nature of a sheep. that is wanting in this or that individual sheep.

DIFFERENCE III.

The *Genus* communicates all his essential properties to his *species*, but the *integrum* doth not communicate his properties to his members. *Genus* is essential to his *species*, communicates his essence and nature, and therefore he
com-

communicates all his essential properties to his species. *Dans formam, dat formiæ consequentia: quicquid tribuitur generi convenit speciei.* Conveniré is to come together: all the essential properties of the *genus* do come together into the world with the *Species*: for nothing can be without his essential properties. If *homo* be *risibilis*, *Socrates est etiam risibilis*. If a plant hath seed within it self, a Vine also hath seed within it self; *Gen*, 1. 11. If art be practical, Logick is practical. And on the other side, those properties which agree not to the *genus*, agree not to the *Species*. If Art be not a habit, Logick is not a habit: the nature of a thing and the properties go both together. *Tollens naturas, tollit proprietates: tollens proprietates, tollit naturas.*

I wonder that M. Hudson I. 80. should affirme, that a *genus* is not capable of adjuncts. *That which hath inherent accidents existing in it as its own, that is an integral: for a genus is not capable of them.*

Answ. Risibility is an adjunct of man existing in him as his own, it is his own propriety he doth not borrow it from any other. It is a property of man firstly, and agrees to Socrates because he is a man. It is a Catholike property belonging to man as man. *Homo est animal risibile*, is a catholike axiom which it, called καθόλου πρώτου *primum de toto* because this is first true of the whole, and then of the parts; it is first true of *homo*, and then of *Socrates*, and *Plato*, *Omne animal risibile est homo: Omnis homo est animal risibile*. But it cannot be said truely, that *omne animal risibile est Plato*.

We have heard that the properties of the *genus* are communicated to the *species*; but the properties of the *integrum* are not communiated to the members; for the members are essential to the integral. *Socrates est risibilis*, yet it cannot be said properly, *pes Socratis est risibilis*, *Socrates est capax disciplinae*, but you cannot say that his heel is capable of discipline Mr Hudson p. 93. saith, *that this is true only of integrum dissimilare, not of similare.* For a whole pint of water (saith he) doth moysten and cool; and so doth every drop.

Answ. These properties agree to a drop, not as it is a part, or member of a pint, but because it is a *species* of water, having the forme of water in it to which all the properties do belong. One Bee makes honie not because it is a member of this swarme, but because it is a *species* of Bee in general having all his essential properties.

DIFFERENCE III.

Genus communicates his operations to his *species*; but *integrum* doth not communicate his operations to all his members. All the essential operations of the *genus* are in every *species*. If the *genus* communicate his entire nature, and all his essential properties to his *species*, he communicates also all his essential operations; *operatio sequitur esse*. If it communicate his qualities,
and

and principles of acting it communicates his operations: for *frustrà fit potentia, quæ nunquam reductur in actum*. It is true that genus exists and acts in his species; and *integrum* acts not without his members: If a star shines the north star shines.

Mr Hudson conceives that *genus* is inefficacious, *That* (saith M. Hudson) *which hath actions and operations of its own, is an integral; for a Genus is not capable thereof.*

Reason, 1. Every real being is capable of operations.

Genus is a real being.

Therefore *genus* is capable of operations.

The *major* is clear; because *operatio sequitur esse*, the operation of a thing followeth the being of it. *Omne ens agit*; because it is *propter finem*: that which is for an end, workes or can worke for that end: but every being is for an end: *ergo*.

The *minor*, that *genus* is a real being hath been prov'd before.

Reas. 2. A second reason that *genus* is capable of operations, is taken from his properties, and qualities; we have proved that *genus* is not empty of such things as those are.

That which hath proper qualities and principles, whereby it is able to work, is capable of operations.

Genus hath proper qualities, and principles, whereby he is able to worke.

Therefore *genus* is capable of operations.

We have made it evident, that *genus* hath properties, and proper qualities: And *frustrà fit potentia, quæ nunquam reductur in actum*.

Reas. 3. A third reason is from the sad consequence which followes upon this position.

If no *genus*, no kind of things is capable of operations, all kind of things are made in vaine:

But all kind of things are not made in vaine;

Therefore *genus* is capable of operations,

For it is certain, that no kind of thing can attaine his end without operation; where there is no $\pi\rho\alpha\xi\iota\varsigma$, there can be no $\epsilon\upsilon\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\xi\iota\alpha$, or well working; which is the end of every kind of being.

Reas. 4. If there be operations proper to every kind, *genus* is capable of operations.

There are operations proper to every kind.

Therefore *genus* is capable of operations.

There are some operations proper to Angel-kind, some to mankind, some to other kinds. To bring forth fruit is proper to a Tree, not to be expected from

from a star, &c. To bring forth, and to bear grapes, is proper to a Vine, &c. *Men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles.* Matth. 7. 16. There are some operations peculiar to Lyons, some to Bees &c. I mean, that are proper to the whole kind.

DIFFERENCE V.

The name of the *genus* may be given to the *species*; but the name of the integral cannot be given to the member: because the *genus* is *totum essentiale*, communicating his whole nature, and all his essential properties and operations to his *species*: and the names of things are suitable to their natures *Homo*, the name of a man, is given to *Socrates*, *Plato* &c. but the name of man is not given to his finger or toe: for a member hath but part of the nature of the whole in it.

Obj. Pars similis hath the name of the integrum: a drop of water is water.

Ans. A drop of water is *species*. *Aqua*, and *haec aqua*, are *genus* and *species*, as Mr *Hooker* speaks.

That *aqua* and *haec aqua* are *genus* and *species*, may appear.

Res. 1. Where there is an essential predication of the whole of his part, there is *genus* and *species*;

But in *aqua*, and *haec aqua*, there is an essential praedication; of the whole of his part.

Ergo.

The reason is, because *genus* onely is *totum essentiale partibus*.

Res. 2. *Haec aqua* hath some *genus*.

But this water hath no *genus* but water;

Therefore this water hath water for his *genus*.

Res. 3. If two drops of water are *eiusdem generis*, then *aqua* is their *genus*.

But two drops of water are *eiusdem generis*.

Ergo.

It is not absurd that there should be many thousand *species* of water in one pailful, and many thousand sands in one handful, and many thousand Bees in one hive.

DIFFERENCE VI.

Genus est τῆ φύσει prius *speciebus*, & *membra integro priora*: the *genus* is before his *species* in priority of nature, and the member before the *iniconum*. The reason is, because *genus* is a note of the causes, *integrum* of the effect: the causes are in order of nature before the effect, and the effect after the causes. The *genus* is essential to his parts, giving causes to the *species*; the members are essential to the integral, communicating essence to it: the more universal, general

general, or common any thing is, the more priority of nature it hath. *Animal est prius homine (est enim terminis communior quam homo homo before Socrates.*

As *genus* is *prius* so it is *notius naturâ*. *Claritas generis non dependet à claritate speciei, sed huic sese communitat*; singulars may be better known to us, but universals are by nature better known then specials: *Homo* is better known then *Socrates*, or *Plato*; *Animal* better known then any of them; and substance better then that: *ens à primo* is better known then any of them all: because it draws neerer to *ens primum* which is *notissimum, & maximè intelligibile. Prius & notius naturâ eadem sunt*. But the members are before the integral in order of nature, for that is made up of the members; and therefore cannot be before them. A house cannot be before the foundation and superstruction: A tree cannot be before the root, body, and branches. Mr *Hooker* p. 255. in his rational discourse about the nature of *integrum*, made it appear as clear as the Sun, that the members which make up, and constitute the whole, are in order of nature before it. Yet Mr *Hudson* p. 219. seemeth to plead for the priority of an integral; affirming, *that the nature of the Church Catholike, visible in respect of the particulars, is like to the priority of a Kingdom, to the parts of it; or of a corporation, in respect of the parts of it Which is not meant (saith Mr Hudson) in a mathematical or techtonical consideration: for so the particular buildings are prima, and the whole city Orta. Yet, (saith he) so M. Hooker understands me.*

Answ. Mr *Hooker* speaks not of a city only in respect of the artificial buildings: but he speaketh of a civil body or corporation, and a political Kingdom: which bodies politick, and corporations hold correspondence with a city, having many houses and buildings in it; which houses and buildings are in nature before the whole city; which is the effect arising from those causes: So likewise the members of every body politick, are in nature before the entire body it self, which is made up of those causes. A city in a techtonical consideration may be first in intention, perfection and dignity, as well as a civil, or ecclesiastical corporation.

Mr *Hudson* speaks, as if a city attended in a techtonical consideration, could not be first intended. For Mr *Hudson* opposeth these; *which is not meant (saith Mr Hudson) in a techtonical consideration, but in regard of intentions, &c.*

But it is a common rule, that which is first in intention, is last in execution, & *contrà*. The finishing and compleating the whole city is last in execution in a techtonical consideration; why may it not be first in intention? but no integral body is first in essence. Mr *Hudson* p. 219. affirms, *that the integral Church is first in essence*; which I confess is above the reach of my shallow reason

reason; for the members give essence to the whole; that is, matter and form: and the integrum receives essence from them, being a symbol of the effect. And how is it possible to conceive that that should be first in essence, that is last in essence, receiving his essence from the essence of the parts?

Neither can any integrum be first *cognitione distinctâ & noscibilitate perfectâ*: it may be *notius nobis* analytically, but not *notius naturâ* genetically. When we analyse the frame and workmanship of god, we meet with the effects, and go from them to the causes, which we perceive by their effects: but the causes are better knowne by nature: because as *Res sese habent in esse, ita in cognosci*, the intelligibility and Cognoscibility of things, followeth their Entity and being.

Mr *Hudson p. 278* speaks well and truly, *cognitio sequitur ordinem naturæ in se*, But how the Kingdom of England can be known without or before the knowledge of the distinct parts, I am not able to conceive. A man may indeed know the Policy, Laws, and Priviledges; and not know all the severall Towns: but the Towns are not the members of the Laws and Priviledges. A man cannot know the body of Laws distinctly, before he knows any of the particular Laws; For it is certain, that as the essence of a thing consists in his causes, so the knowledge of the essence of a thing consists in the knowledge of the Causes. The common place of causes, is the fountain of all Science; *Scirique demum creditur, cujus Causa teneatur: ut merito dicatur à Poëtâ. Fœlix qui potuit rerum cognoscere Causas*. It is a speculative happiness, and the fœlicity of the understanding, to know the Causes of things. But there is but small happiness to see the outside of the thing, not understanding the essentiall Causes, and ingredients into the essence, and being of it: A man may as well know the nature and essence of a thing distinctly, without the knowledge of his distinct nature and essence; as know a thing distinctly, without knowledge of his Causes.

We have heard of some consecutaries, from the definition of *Genus*; I shall observe two things from the definition of *species specialissima* (which is that which cannot be divided into other *species*.) The first is that *individuum est species*. The second is that though *species specialissima* cannot be divided into other *species*, yet it may be divided into members.

1. *Individuum est species*

Every singular, or individuall thing is a *species*.

Touching this question I shall first explicate, secondly confirm the Truth.

1. The explication may be given in these following *theses*, or positions.

THESIS. I.

The variation onely of scituation or Accidents, is not sufficient to vary the *species*

1. Here I concur with Mr *Hudson* p. 91. This man is an English man; This English man is a Suffolk man; This Suffolck man is an *Ipswich* man. This praedication is *denominatio Adjunctae personae à subjectis*. If a man remove his habitation from one Country to another, or from one Land to another, this make him not another species. As it is sayd *Caelum non animum mutant &c.* so I may say, *Caelum non speciem mutant, qui trans mare currunt*. The place is but a Subject, and not essentiall, and cannot make an essentiall difference between a man and himself.

2. Augmentation in stature, old Age, &c. make not a specificall difference; *gradus non variant speciem*.

3. Variation of sex doth not vary the *species*; the same person may be *Mas*, & *femina*. An Hermaphrodite, or Androgyne, is not two persons or *species*; and yet is both man and woman.

4. Various *species* must be various things, between which there is an essentiall difference.

THESIS. II.

Various *species* must fall under the essentiall predication of some kind, which is of a more general or comprehensive nature: For *species est pars generis*; and the *Genus* is *totum partibus essentielle*: there must be therefore an essentiall praedication of something more general, upon something more speciall; as *Homo, est Animal: Haec Aqua, est aqua*.

THESIS. III.

When we say *Socrates est Homo*, there is an essentiall praedication of *Homo*, which is more generall; upon *Socrates*, which is more speciall. *Homo* is essentiall to *Socrates*, and comprehends *Socrates* and *Plato* under him: this Mr *Hudson* p. 89. grants freely.

THESIS. IIII.

Socrates and *Plato* are *opposita*, opposite one to another: they are *disparata*, that is, such things whereof one is opposed to many; in like manner as a blew colour is opposed to red, green, &c. in like manner *Socrates* is opposed to *Plato*, *Cicero*, *Aristotle*, equally to one as well as to another. Hence *Socrates* and *Plato*, are not only diverse, dissenting in some logical respect; but opposite, dissenting *re & ratione*, really and indeed, they dissent in their own nature, as they are things; there is a bar in their nature, they are set one against another, that they can never be one and the same; as black cannot be white. *Socrates* and *Plato* are two, one cannot be the other, there is an essentiall difference between them.

THESIS. V.

Socrates and *Plato* are distinguisht one from another by their proper and essentiall formes. As a man and a lyon differ in their common forme, so *Socrates*

tes and *Plato* in their proper form. All opposition is firstly from the form; hereby a thing is that which it is, and is therefore by this distinguished from all other things. All essentiall distinction and opposition is from the forms of things; they differ not only accidentally, but essentially one from the other, and are distinguisht one from another by their essentiall forms.

THESIS. VI.

The numericall difference between *Socrates* and *Plato*, is an Argument of their specificall distinction: it includeth and implieth an essentiall difference between things, being distinguished by their proper individuall essentiall forms. It is true, that our intellectualls are so wounded by the Apostacy of the first man, that it is exceeding hard for us to find out the forms of things: we are forced many times to describe the forms of things by their accidents; as we are constrained to describe the Elements by their proper qualities arising from their forms: yet every one of them hath a proper forme. The existence of every thing is from all the causes: nothing can exist and be that which it is, without its proper form. And the difference of the proper form is no less then the difference of the common form, but rather greater. Look how much greater the similitude and agreement is between Singulars in regard of their common forms, so much greater is the difference of their proper forme. The difference and opposition of contraries is the greatest and strongest; and yet they communicate in the same *genus*: these are more opposite one to another then things that are not under the same *genus*: white and black are more opposite, then white and bitter, &c. *Gravia bella fratrum*. To differ so numerically is to differ formally; to differ in number, is to differ in forme: for number is an affection or proper adjunct following the essence. *Socrates* and *Plato* have two distinct forms: hence they differ in essence; hence they have two distinct essences and beings; hence they are two: one cannot be the other, they cannot be both one and the same: hence they differ numerically one from the other. Where there is one humanity and essentiall forme of man, there is one essence of man, and one man: and where there are two humanities, and essentiall, proper, individuall forms of man, there are two men: hence they differ numerically, and one is not the other, or the same with the other. *Socrates* is not *Plato*, but is numerically different from him *Socrates* is one, and *Plato* is another: As *London* is one city, and *York* another. The difference of number is nothing but the difference of the proper and individuall forme, and to differ in number, is to differ in forme: two men have two different forms, two Lyons have two different formes. If *Socrates* and *Plato*, or any other individuall men differing in number, should not differ in essence and forme, they should differ only accidentally one from the other; as one man differs from himself, or as *Socrates* in his old age, differs from *Socrates*

in his youth; being the same man, and differing onely in accidents, not in essence. *Socrates* should be *Plato*; and *Plato*, *Socrates*. And when *Alexander* rides *Bucephalus*, *Aristotle* sits in the same saddle: and it were impossible not to set the saddle upon the right horse; for every horse is the same essentially; and he that stealeth one horse, he stealeth all the horses in the world; because the essence of the one is the same with the essence of the other. There is a difference indeed in accidents, but none in essence; there being (according to this accompt) no essentiall or substantiall difference between them. Lastly, Hence there is (upon the same accompt) no essential and substantial man in the world but only Ideal: for all generals subsist in individuals, and individuals onely subsist in themselves. If therefore individualls differ not essential one from another but only accidentally; there is no substantiall or essential man subsisting by himself: because individuall men only subsist in themselves. If therefore no individuall, proper, essential, humane forme, there is no individuall essentiall man subsisting; and therefore no individuall substantiall man in the world. Every individuall man is an accidentall man, having no proper, substantial, individual form or essence. He that hath no substantial proper form hath no substantial proper essence; and therefore cannot be a substantial individual man. And hence there is no substantial individual man in the world, but only ideal and common: and *Socrates* and *Plato* should differ essentially no more one from another then Doctor *Martin*, and Doctor *Luther*. But the truth is, they have not one and the same essence, but differ in their essential forme one from another. For an accidentall forme cannot be the prime and principall essential Cause of a substance.

THESIS. VII.

The name agrees most properly to Individuals *Species* of the old verb *specio* to see, or behold (as we have heard) signifieth the visible face or appearance of a thing, a sight or thing seen: the Greek word εἶδος of εἶδω, video, signifieth a visible shape, forme, image or representation of a thing: (as we have heard) the reason is, because individualls are onely visible in themselves, we may see some of their faces daily with our bodily eyes. Generalls cannot beseen but in individualls; man cannot beseen, but in *Socrates*, and *Plato*, and other individualls. It is clear therefore, that the name which is a note and representation of the thing, sutes best of all with singulars and individualls.

THESIS. VIII.

Logicians will grant, that *individuum est species*. Not onely *Ramus*, *Berhusius* *Snellius*, *Gutberleth*, &c. but *Aristotle* will grant it: He testifyeth that the last and lowest generall kinds are next above the individualls, as man is Arist. lib. 3. above individuall men. *Extrema, seu ultima genera supra individua sunt, ut Homo*. I might easily name severall Authors who

conceive, that *Homo* is the *Genus* of Individuall men, and that individuall men are *species*. But those are onely inducements, not convincements, being onely inartificiall Arguments. We shall therefore (having propounded these preparatives and explications, somewhat helping to understand the Cause in hand) present some Artificiall Arguments and reasons for the demonstration of this truth, that

Individuum est Species.

Singular Lyons are *species* of lyon in generall. *Socrates, Cicero, Aristotle, Solomon, Plato &c.* are species of *Homo*.

REASON. I.

If *Homo* be the *Genus* of *Socrates* and *Plato*, *Socrates* and *Plato* are *Species* of *Homo*.

But *Homo* is the *Genus* of *Socrates* and *Plato*;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species* of *Homo*.

Major: *Genus* and *species* stand in a mutuall respect, and look one to another, so that *Homo* cannot be *Genus, Socratis & Platonis*, unless *Socrates* and *Plato* are species *Hominis*: *Genus*, as such, hath an eye upon his *species*, and respects nothing else in the world: As the Cause argues nothing but his effect, so the *Genus* argues nothing but his *Species*.

Minor. The proof therefore of the minor is most of all here to be attended, viz. That *Homo* is the *Genus* of *Socrates* and *Plato*: which may appear thus,

Reas. 1. That to which the definition of *Genus* agreeth, is *Genus*:

But the definition of *Genus* agreeth to *Homo*, as he stands in respect to *Socrates* and *Plato*;

Therefore *Homo* is *Genus*, as he stands in respect to *Socrates* and *Plato*.

Genus is *totum partibus essentielle*; and *Homo* is *totum partibus essentielle*, giving essence to *Socrates, Plato*, and the rest of his individualls.

Reas. 2. If *Homo* stand in the same respect to his individualls, in which *Animal* stands to *Homo* and *Brutum*; *Homo* is the *Genus* of all individuall men:

But *Homo* stands in the same respect to his Individualls, in which *Animal* stands to *Homo* and *Brutum*;

Therefore *Homo* is the *Genus* of all individuall men.

Major prob. If *Homo* respects and argueth his individualls, as *Animal* respects and argues *Homo* and *Brutum*, *Homo* hath the affection and respect of a *Genus* to his individualls; For *Animal* hath the affection of a *Genus* to *Homo* and *Brutum*; and therefore, that being granted, there is as good reason that *Homo* should be *Genus* to individuall men.

Minor prob. *Homo* stands affected as much and in like manner to singular

men, as *Animal* to *Homo* and *Brutum*. Is *Animal* more general then *Homo*? *Homo* is more general then *Socrates*, &c. Doth *Animal* comprehend *Homo* & *Brutum*? *Homo* comprehends *Socrates*, & *Plato*, and all other individuall men under him. Is *Animal* essentiall to man and beasts? *Homo* is as essential to *Socrates* and his other individualls. Doth *Animal* communicate himself, and his whole essence to *Homo*? *Homo* is as liberall to *Socrates*, and *Cicero*, and his other individualls; keeps nothing to himself, but unlockes all his treasures of humanity, and bestowes all his whole estate, and all his humane excellencies, his entire nature, matter, and forme, his name, dignity, nobility, and all his titles of honour upon *Socrates*, & his other individualls, and challengeth as great an interest in them, as *Animal* can challenge in *Homo* and *Brutum*. If *Homo* can say, I am *Animal*; *Socrates* can stand upon the same termes with *Homo*, and say I am *Homo*. If *Homo* can say *Animal* is mine, and all that he hath; *Socrates* can say *Homo* is mine, and all that he hath.

Reas. 3. *Homo* is either *genus*, or *species*, in respect of individual men;

But *homo* is not *species*, in respect of individual men.

Therefore *homo* is *genus* in respect of individual men.

Major. *Homo* stands in some respect to individuals and singulars: Let any man put any other respect upon *homo*, as he respects his singulars, but either *genus* or *species*.

Minor. It cannot be a *species* (as some would have it) for it is called *species* onely in respect of his *genus*. If it be a *species* of singular men, of *Socrates*, *Plato*, &c. then those individuals must be his *genus*, and *Socrates* should be more general then *homo*. But it is clearer then the light of the sun, that *homo* is more general.

Reas. 4. If all individual men are *ejusdem generis*, of the same kind, all comprehended under mankind, *homo* is *genus*.

But all indiividual men are *ejusdem generis*, of the same kind, all comprehended under mankind;

Therefore *homo* is their *genus*

What else can be their next *genus*?

REBSAN II.

If the definition of *species* agreeth to *Socrates* and *Plato*, *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species*:

But the definition of *species* agreeth to *Socrates* and *Plato*;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species*.

Minor prob. *Species est pars generis*, a part of the kind: *Socrates* and *Plato* are parts of mankind; they are of that stock and kindred, comprehended under that kind, and are parts of it. They can be no other but parts of mankind universally considered. If all the men in the world should be anni-

annihilated but *Socrates* and *Plato*, there were yet a part of mankind remaining in the world.

REASON III.

Those parts which have the Entire nature, matter, forme and properties of the kind communicated to them, are *species*:

Socrates and *Plato* have the entire nature, matter, form and properties of the kind communicated to them;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species*.

Major, It is proper to the *species* (as we have heard) to have the Entire nature and properties of the *genus* communicated to it. If a member had the Entire nature of the *Genus* communicated to it, a member were an *integrum*.

Minor, *Socrates est Animal rationale*, and hath the whole nature of *Homo*, and all his properties communicated to him: he is *Risibilis*, and hath all humane properties which are essentiall to the whole kind.

REASON. IIII.

Those things which have one and the same common nature, and are specifically distinguisht one from another, are *species*:

Socrates and *Plato* have one and the same common nature, and are distinguished specifically one from another.

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species*.

The *Major* is evident *primo aspectu*: The *minor* shall be cleared.

Those which are distinguished one from another by their proper essentiall formes, are specifically distinguished one from another:

Socrates and *Plato* are distinguished one from another by their proper essentiall formes;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are specifically distinguished one from another.

We have made it clear in some of those *Theses* which we have propounded, that *Socrates* and *Plato* are distinguished one from another, not accidentally, but by their proper essentiall formes: and that to differ numerically, is to differ by their proper forme.

REASON V.

Speciall beings comprehended and contained under that which is more generall, are *species*.

Socrates and *Plato* are speciall beings comprehended under that which is more generall;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species*.

What are *species*, but speciall beings *i. e.*, such beings as have a more speciall nature and forme comprehended and contained under some more generall head?

Individuall

Individuall men are speciall beings, &c *Socrates* and *Plato* are speciall men, each having a speciall forme (as we have heard) they are speciall men, more contracted then *Homo* in *Genere*. Whatsoever is more contracted, is more speciall: But the *Idea* of *Plato* or *Socrates* is more contracted then the *Idea* of *Homo* in generall; therefore they are more speciall: *Socrates* is not a generall, but a speciall man, having a speciall nature, besides his common nature. *Socrates* springs not from the same speciall individuall principles out of which *Plato* is made.

REASON. VI.

Singular parts, bearing the name of the whole, are *Species*:

Socrates and *Plato* are singular parts, bearing the name of their whole;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species*.

A member not having the Entire nature of the *Integrum*, is never called by the name of the *Integrum*, as we have heard. But the *species* having the whole essence, and definition of the *Genus* in it, is called by the name of the *Genus*.

A foot not having the Entire nature of *Homo* in it, is not called *Homo*: But *Socrates* having the Entire nature of humanity in him, is called *Homo*. He hath *integram naturam hominis in se*. There is nothing in humanity, which is not to be found in him: and therefore the name of man may well be given to him; he is an intire man. *Qui habet humanitatem in se integram, est homo*; *Socrates habet humanitatem in se integram, Ergo Socrates est homo*.

The second thing to be observed concerning *species specialissima*, is this conclusion which followeth.

Although *species specialissima* cannot be divided into other *species*, yet it may be divided into members.

Socrates who is *species specialissima* may also be considered as an *Integrum*, & so be divided into members. An individuall Vine cannot be divided into more *species*: but as it containeth root, body, and branches, it may be divided into members.

Divers respects may fall upon the same things or may *concrecere* and grow together upon the same subject. *Dialectica concrecit cum seipsâ, & cum aliis omnibus concresoentibus*. A singular vine, as it beareth grapes, is *causa*: as it exists from its principles or causes it is an effect: as it stands in the vineyard it is an adjunct: as it containeth root, body and branches, there are *integrum & membra*: As it respects a vine *in genere*, it is *species*. The definition, rule and notion of *species* and *integrum* are different; *integrum* and *species* are diverse and various Logical respects, which cannot be the same one with another; yet the same thing which is *integrum*, may also be *species*. Suppose a man should reason thus, that vine which hath root, body, and branches, is an *integrum*:

tegrum: this individual vine hath root, body, and branches; therefore this individual vine is an *integrum*. It may appear from hence, that which is *species specialissima*, may be also *integrum*. And this may serve to make one of our former principles appear with greater clearness and evidence, *viz.* that the entire nature of the *genus* is in the *species*: the entire nature of a vine is in this individual vine. In like manner every individual church hath the entire nature of a church in it. An individual church is a *species*, as it respects a church in general, under which it is comprehended; yet as it containeth members, it is an integral. Hence it is that every individual church containeth members, because it is an *integrum*; and yet is a *species* as it stands in reference to a Church *in genere*. Hence also a Church *in genere* may be said to have members and officers in it, not considered under the nature of *Genus* (The Arguments of *Genus* and *Integrum* cannot be the same: *Genus* and *integrum* cannot be the same *in Actu signato*) but because the *species specialissima* containeth members as it is *Integrum*; And this *species specialissima* is comprehended under the *genus*. In this sense a *Genus* may be truly said to have officers in it. This Mr *Hudson* p. 2. denieth, his words are, *A Genus is not capable of officers. A.* It is true *in actu signato*, but that which is *Genus*, comprehending the *species* and individualls which containe members may in that respect be said to comprehend members and officers. This may appear by observing some formes of reasoning which may be propounded. *Ex. gr.* Every entire Ecclesiastical body politick containeth officers & other members: *Boston Church* is an entire, Ecclesiasticall body politick; Therefore *Boston Church* containeth officers and members. This Argumentation is a *genere ad speciem*: An entire Ecclesiastical body politick is the *Genus*, and *Boston Church* the *species*. This may serve to answer that Argument which Mr *Hudson* p. 84. 85, 86. useth, to prove that the Church Catholike is an integral, taken from the several appellations which are given to the Church Catholike in scripture. *It is called a body, a kingdom, a tabernacle, a city, an army, a sheepfold, a wheat field, a barn-floor, a drag-net, a loaf of bread. Now all these* (saith M. *Hudson* p. 86.) *and many more appellations have no analogie to a genus, but to an Integrum.*

I answer, that those and such appellations are firstly and properly appellations of an *integrum*, having *Analogie* to *Totum integrale*. But this *totum integrale* is *species specialissima*; or every individuall Church being *species specialissima*, is also an *integrum*, and containeth members: and the *genus* comprehending all his *species* under him, it comprehends the individualls with all their members under it, or within it self. Hence those appellations which are given to an individual Church, are given to the Church in General. *Quicquid affirmatur & negatur de specie, etiam affirmatur & negatur de genere particulariter: Et quicquid essentiale affirmatur & negatur de genere, affirmatur etiam & negatur de specie.*

If a Church be a body, then this or that individual Church is a body and all the members, of it are *σῦσσωμα* one and the same body, of one and the same Corporation.

A Church is a bodie:

Boston corgregation is a Church;

Therefore *Boston* congregat on is a bodie.

Mr. *Hudson* p. 84. saith that a Genus is no body.

Ans. Yet a body or Integrum considered in *Genere*, is *Genus*. Mr *Hooker* p. 85. doth not say that a *Genus* is a body, and the particular *species* are fitly joynd together and compacted, by that which every joynt supplyeth; as Mr *Hudson* insinuates: But Mr *Hooker* p. 268. affirmeth that the particular members of a congregation are compacted together, and where there are many particular Churches there is *Totum genericum existens*.

I might say the like of the other appellations;

A Church is a Kingdom, Tabernacle, Temple, City, &c.

Boston corgregation is a Church;

Therefore *Boston* congregation is a Kingdom, Tabernacle, Temple, Citie &c.

We have heard of the rules concerning *Genus*; we now proceed to the application of those rules to the question in hand, where we shall first return answer to Mr *Hudson* his Arguments. Secondly propound reasons tending to prove that a congregational Church is a Catholike Church.

CHAPTER III.

Containing an answer to Mr Hudson his Arguments propounded in his fourth chapter; wherein he laboureth to prove, that the Church Catholicke visible, is one Integral, or Totum Integrale.

I cannot enlarge as I would; I shall therefore return a brief answer in these several conclusions following.

CONCLUSION I.

Totum genericum existit in rerum naturá. The general or Universal whole is really existing in nature. See the fifth Conclusion concerning the agreement between *Genus* & *Integrum*. This answers Mr *Hudson* his first Argument p. 78, 79.

CONCLUSION II.

Totum genericum habet partes extra partes. See the first conclusion concerning the agreement of *Genus* and *integrum*. This answers Mr *Hudson* his second argument p. 79.

CON-

CONCLUSION III.

Individual Christians, which are not members of any particular congregation, are not formally political Church members. Visible saints are the matter of a visible Church; and in that respect may be said to be members *Materialiter*, but not *formaliter*; because they are not confederate. The woman of Canaan was a visible saint and beleever, yet was not formally a member of the *Jewish Church*: A proselyte was called *filius fœderis*, a son of the covenant.

A regenerate man excommunicated, is no Political Church member. The Apostles were members of the Church at Jerusalem, *Acts* 1. vers. 2, 3, 13, 14, &c. The Apostles had an extraordinary commission and influence into all Churches: But this is not sufficient to demonstrate that all Churches made one integral. This may serve to answer Mr *Hudsons* third Argument p. 79, 80.

CONCLUSION III.

A *Genus* is capable of inherent Accidents. See the third difference between *Genus* and *Integrum*.

A Church compacted according to the institution of Christ, is visible, beautifull, terrible.

Boston Church is compacted according to the institution of Christ; Therefore *Boston Church* is visible, terrible, beautiful.

By this manner of reasoning, *a genere ad speciem*, it is evidential that those accidents to properties do firstly belong to the *genus*, or to a church *in genere*; and then to an individual Church, as a *species* of that *genus*.

A *genus* is also capable of being *majus* and *minus*, *in actu exercito*. Man-kind is capable of increase: vertue shall increase at the calling of the Jewes: If humility, chastity, justice, faithfulness, and contentation (which are the *species* of vertue) shall increase, then vertue which is the *genus* shall increase; when injustice abounds (which is *species peccati*) *peccatum* (which is the *genus*) abounds: If the *species* be extended, the *genus* is extended also; *Quicquid affirmatur & negatur de specie, etiam affirmatur & negatur de genere particulariter*. That the *genus* may be mutable and fluxile, we have heard. See the first conclusion concerning the agreement of *genus* and *integrum*. *Genus* also is measurable by time and place. See conclusion fift concerning the agreement of *genus* and *Integrum*. These may answer Mr *Hudson* his fourth Argument. p. 80, 81.

CONCLUSION V.

A *genus* may be capable of admission and ejection of parts. See second Conclusion concerning *species specialissima*, wherein we may find an answer to Mr *Hudson* his fifth Argument p. 81. 82.

CONCLUSION VI.

A *Genus* may be capable of officers. See conclusion second, concerning *species specialissima*.

Every entire compleat Ecclesiastical society or Church is furnished with officers.

Boston congregation is a compleate intire Church, or a compleate Ecclesiastical society

Therefore *Boston* Church is furnished with officers.

This is part of an answer to Mr *Hudson* his sixth Argument p. 82. I shall add a word more to fill up the answer.

There are no habituall officers in the Church: all officers in the Church are actuall officers. Habitual officers are *non Ens possibile, quod non est sed potest esse*. Lawyers may in this sense be called habitual officers of the Church, for they may officiate in a Church when they are called.

CONCLUSION VII.

The Church Catholike hath actions and operations of its own; it is true that it exists and acts in its Individualls, yet his properties are his owne, and so likewise are his operations. See the fourth difference between *Genus* and *Integrum*. This answers his seventh Argument p. 82.

CONCLUSION VIII.

The severall Appellations which are given to the Church Catholike, are not a sufficient demonstration, that it is an *Integrall*. See conclusion second concerning *species specialissima*. This answereth Mr *Hudson* his eighth Argument p., 84 85. And also his ninth Argument p. 86, 87.

CONCLUSION IX.

The invisible Church (not being distinguished into several political bodies) may be an *Integrum*: yet the visible political Church, distinguished into severall congregations, may be a *genus*: and those several congregations, the severall *species*. The name of the whole may be given to one, and not to the other. A thousand visible beleivers in confoederation one with another, &c. may be called a visible Church: But a thousand invisible saints cannot be called an invisible Church. Here is no visible political *vinculum* or bond to bind all Churches together in one *Integral* body. This may answer Mr *Hudson* his tenth Argument. p. 87.

CONCLUSION X.

The Church covenant is not onely a covenant between man and man, but also between God and man. We read of *two staves*, *Zach.* 11. 7, 10, 14. *Beautie* and *Bands*: there was not onely a covenant between man and man, signified by *bands*; but also a covenant, which God made with his people, signified by his staff, beauty. We may find this double covenant exprest

Isaiah 62. 5.

Isaiah 62. 5. As a Bridegroom rejoyceth over the bride, so shall thy God rejoyce over thee. Here is implied a covenant between God and his people. And as a young man marrieth a virgin, so shall thy sons marry thee. There is implied a covenant between man and man. When we enter into Church covenant, we binde our selves to God, and to our Bretheren, to walke with God and one with another, according to the rules of divine politie. We make not the Covenant between man and man the forme of the Church. Here Mr *Hudson* is mistaken: who affirms, *that the covenant of particular congregations is a covenant between man and man: And this (saith Mr Hudson) we make the form of particular congregations.* See Mr *Hudson* pag. 90.

CONCLUSION XI.

Baptisme is an adjunct priviledge of a political Church member, as circumcision was a priviledge of the members of the *Iewish* Church; *Gen. 17.* Those *Acts 2,* were admitted into the Church, and then Baptized. they are said *to be Baptised in the name of the Lord Iesus;* not because the Apostles could alter the forme of Baptisme prescribed by Christ (they were to Baptise all *in the name of the Father, & in the name of the Son, & of the holy Ghost. Math. 28. 19.*) but because they submitted to the power of Christ in his Church and ordinances, and owned him for their Lord, and politicall head, and then were Baptized. The same expression also we find *Acts. 10. 48.* The Eunuch was a proselyte, a member of the *Iewish* Church. Obsignation with the initialle seale of Baptisme implyeth confoederation, and admission into the Church. Suppose a Master of Artes in one University, takes the same degree in another University, without repetition of his former degree, which is included in the second; this is no Argument that all Universities are members, and that there is one integral Universitys consisting of them all. A man that hath been Baptized in one Church, and received the Lords supper there, if he remove to another church and receive the Lords supper there, without repetition of his Baptisme (for that must not be repeated) this is no evidence, that there is one integral Church of which all Churches are members. This may serve to Answer that which Mr *Hudson* writes pag. 90. his apprehension is, *that a man who is no member of any particular congregation, may be Baptized.*

CONCLUSION XII.

A congregation may remove from one place to another, and yet be the same individual congregation. A man doth not vary his *species* as often as he varieth his place: A Church doth not vary its *species*, as often as it varieth its place; yet two distinct congregations, are distinct *species*, as two men are. This answers to that Question of M. *Hudson* p. 91.

CONCLUSION XIII.

Genus containing the common matter, and also the common forme of the *species*, because the special forme is a member of the *species*, the *genus* may be said to contain the special forme, and to hold together the one with the other. A man may be said to hold a sword in his hand, when he holds only the hilt, haft, or handle in his hand he holds the sword by the handle, which is but a part of it. So likewise the *genus* holding, the *species* by the common forme, which is but a part of the *species*, yet, because the proper forme is another part, and joyned to it, the *genus* may be said to contain the *species*: As *Homo* holdeth *Socrates* by his common forme of humanity, to which his proper forme of *Socrateity* being adjoyned, *Homo* holdeth *Socrates*, and so may be said to contain individual men, which are his *species*. This may answer that which Mr *Hudson* propounds pag. 95. *Totum essentiale sive Genericum* doth not comprise the forme of the *species* in it self, but giveth the matter or common nature to the *species*.

I cannot but dissent from Mr *Hudson* his judgement concerning the constitution of the Catholicke Church, expressed in the next following words of the same pag. viz. p. 95. The Church Catholike is made up of the matter and forme of the particular Churches conjoyned; as a whole house of the particular rooms in it. For Mr *Hudson* saith that the Catholicke Church is first in essence: but a whole house is not first in essence, before the particular roomes of which it is made up. I never heard of a house consisting of several rooms, that was first made up of all the rooms in it, having the rooms made afterwards. One room may be made before a whole house consisting of several rooms; but it is impossible (I conceive) that the whole house containing all those rooms, should be made up before the several rooms are made.

CHAPTER V.

Containing Arguments tending to demonstrate that a congregational Church is a Catholike Universal visible Church: wherein a few propositions are presented, by way of explication.

PROPOSITION I.

THE Church of Christ at Jerusalem was the mother of us all: the primitive Church out of which all the true visible Churches in the world have swarmed, *Gal. 4. 25.*

PROPOSITION II.

The Greek word ἐκκλησία (Latine *Concio*) in English, Church; in a *Theological* sence, is properly given to an Ecclesiasticall political body: for it signifies properly an assembly of *Citizens*, lawfully called together by a *Beadle*, *Town clerk* or such like publick officer; to attend their civil affaires as in *Cambridge* the *Beadles* call a congregation; it is used *Acts. 19. 32. 39. 41.* translated assembly. It is taken therefore in the *Theological* use of it for an assembly of heavenly *Citizens* joyned together in a Political society and corporation, and meeting together according to divine institution, to worship Christ, and attend the affairs of his house and Kingdome.

A congregational Church is the proper subject of the rules of Ecclesistical discipline and policie, which is to be guided to its publick foelicity by the rules of divine policy; as a *Civil* society is guided by the rules of Civil policy to its Civil happiness This was one piece of the misery of the Ephesians and other Gentiles before their calling; they were not onely dead in sin, children of wrath by nature &c. for so were the Jewes, but they were also without Christ, as political head of the visible Church and aliens from the policie of Israel. *Eph. 2. 12.* The ground of it we find in the same place and that is, they were strangers from the Covenants: that is, from the Church Covenant, which is not only a Covenant between God and man, but also between man and man; and was often renewed in the old Testament: and for those reasons especially, it is called Covenants in the plural number; and from thence followed a double misery: first that they were without those faire hopes and possibilities of the good things promised.

2. And without the worship of God or ordinances of divine worship, which the Jewes had, being Church members.

PROPOSITION III.

All the visible Churches of the Gospel, which are the genuine Children of that primitive Church, are political bodies. *Visibilis dicitur ecclesia prop-*

Sohnnius Scrip. *ter ordinem ecclesiasticum, ac formam exteriorem, ac visibilens, quæ*
Method. *quidem fecit, ut ecclesia sit, et dicatur visibilis: Sohnnius.*

PROPOSITION IV.

The Catholike Visible Church is to be found in the Churches of the Gospel, and in the days of Christ. Before his exhibition there was a domestical Church, and a national Church, but no Catholike Church; which is opposed to the Jewish Church. The Church was first in families, and then *in populo*, and that was either *in populo Israelitico*, or *Catholico*: when the Son of God himself came into the world, it was too light a business for him to raise up the Tribes of Israel, but he must be a light to the Gentiles, and salvation to the end of the earth: He must haue his Honours, and Royal Houses, and keep his Court among all nations. The Church is not confined to *Judea*, or limited to any part or corner of the earth, but may be extended far and wide over all the world. Therefore the Field is called the world.

PROPOSITION V.

The name Catholike doth most properly agree to a generical Church, to a church as the *genus* of al churches. *Integrum*, an integral whole, or *totum*, is called ὅλον & συνόλον but *totum genericum*, or *genus* is properly called τὸ καθόλου A generical whole is properly called catholike and universal: *genus* and *universale* are all one and the same notion; an integral church may be called a whole church, or (if you will) a synholick church, but not so properly a catholike church.

PROPOSITION VI.

A congregational church is a catholike generical church, the *genus* of all churches in the world. A church or congregation is the *Genus* of all congregations; and the several churches and individual congregations, as *Boston* church, *Capel* church, *Hartford* church, are the species of church *in genere*.

REASON I.

That which communicates his whole essence to *Boston* church, *Capel* church, and all individual churches, is a catholike generical universal church, and the *genus* of those individuals:

A congregational church communicates his whole essence to *Boston* church, *Capell* church, &c.

Therefore a congregational church is a catholike, generical universall church, and the *genus* of these individuals.

The *major* is clear at the first sight, if we consider the definition of *genus*, which is *totum partibus essentialibus*. The *genus* is that which is essential, *i. e.* that
which

which communicates his whole essence consisting of matter & form, to his parts.

The *minor* is apparent, for a congregational church communicates his whole essence, his matter and form to *Boston* church, and the whole essence of a visible, political congregational church is found in *Boston* church, and in all true churches and faithful congregations of Christ.

There are visible saints which are the matter of a church we read of Saints at *Rome*, *Corinth*, &c. and all churches are churches of the saints; 1 *Cor.* 14. 33. these are the materials of this glorious Temple. Saints are men separated from the world, dedicated unto God. This is the glory of a congregation to be of such glorious materials. It is a pleasant sight to see churches filled with such men; with men that know God, and love God, having derived a principle of life from Christ by faith. All church members must be visible saints, having a competent measure of knowledge, and blameless life: *Mat.* 5. 19. *Rev.* 22. 14.

1. There is also a confaederation, either explicite or implicate; whereby church members stand bound to walk with God, and one with another in the ways of the worship of Christ, according to the rules of divine policie. An explicite covenant is not essential to a church, because explicitness is but an adjunct of the covenant and because Christ hath had visible churches in all ages since the primitive church, and yet an explicite covenant cannot be found in all ages; yet it is to be desired, and there is much of the visible glory of Christ appearing in it: when men visibly bind themselves, and their children also to Christ, they cannot bind them to a better Master. *Isaiah* 44. 5. All Jacobs Children were inrolled in the catalogue of the church.

REASON II

That *totum* which giveth his name to *Boston* Church, *Capel* church, and all individual churches, is a catholike, generical, universal church, and the *genus* of all those churches.

A congregational church giveth his name to *Boston* church, *Capel* church, and all individual churches:

Therefore a congregational church is a catholike universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches.

It is true (which M. Hudson speaks, pag. 90.) that every visible beleever is a christian; and it is as true, that a christian is a generical, and Paul an individual christian, and these are genus and species.

Every church member is a member of Christ his Kingdom, because every church is a Kingdom of Christ.

We have proved that *pars similis is species*; and that *aqua*, and *haec aqua*, are *genus* and *species*; and that it is the peculiar prerogative of the *genus* to communicate his name with his nature to his species.

Integrum cannot communicate his whole essence to every member; for

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then there would be so many men in every man, as there are fingers, and toes, and members in his body. Therefore every finger, and toe, and member cannot be called by the name of a man. The members of a man, being essential to him, make him a man: but a man cannot communicate his whole humanity to all his members, and make them so many men. It is most just and meete therefore, that a mans finger, not being a man, should want the name and title of a man, because such names must be given to things as may hold proportion with their natures.

Minor, Boston church, Capel church, and every individual church, is a congregational church, and is called by the name of a church or congregation. Therefore a congregational church is a catholike, universal church, and the genus of all churches.

REASON 3.

There is a *genus* of all individual churches:

There is no *genus* of individual churches, but only a congregational church;

Therefore a congregational church is the *genus* of all individual churches.

Their community of nature is an evidence that they have a *genus*, and are comprehended under some more general head: and there is no other next *genus*, but only a congregational church; I speake only of their next *genus*: for a body politick is *genus generalissimum*, or a higher and more general *genus*.

REASON 4.

If all individual churches are species, a congregational church is the *genus* of all individual churches:

But all individual churches are *species*;

Therefore a congregational church is the *genus* of all individual churches.

That all individual churches are *species*, is evident, because all individuals are *species*, as wee haue proved in the first conclusion concerning *species specialissima*

REASON 5.

If all individual churches are *ejusdem generis*, and are distinguished specifically one from another, a congregational church is a catholike generical universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches:

But all individual churches are *ejusdem generis*, and are distinguished specifically one from another;

Therefore a congregational church is a catholike, generical, universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches.

They are all *ejusdem generis*, of the same kind, being all congregational churches; *Boston church* is a congregational church, *Capel church* and *Hartford church* are of the same kind.

All have the same general matter and form, the same ordinances and officers *de jure*, they differ not one from another in their general kind, having all the same common nature, and that they are distinguished specifically one from another; is as evident *Boston* church, *Hartford* church, *Capel* church, are *disparata*, and therefore *opposita*, and essentially distinguished one from another; it is impossible that one should be the other. The assembly of saints at *Philippi* are not essentially the same with those at *Ephesus*; those at *Ephesus* are not the same with those at *Corinth*. We have proved before that individuals are really, formally and essentially distinguished one from another.

REASON 6.

If a congregational church communicate all his essential properties or proper adjuncts to individual churches, a congregational church is a catholike generical, universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches:

But a congregational church communicates all his essential properties or proper adjuncts to individual churches:

Therefore a congregational church is a catholike, generical universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches.

The *integrum* doth not communicate all his properties to every members; a mans finger is not *risible*, is not indued with a power of laughter: But the *genus* communicating his whole essence, communicates all his essential properties to his species, as we have heard.

A congregational church communicates all his essential properties to individual churches. Ecclesiastical ordinances, Officers, Seales, and Censures, are the proper priviledges of a congregational church.

And all these are to be found there.

All the springs of God are there *Psal.* 87. 7. there we may meet with Jehovah himself the first being. All the water in springs is derived from the sea by secret pipes and channels under the Earth. The first being is an infinite sea of being and goodness, and he communicates himself, and poureth out most glorious sweet influences of himself in his own ordinances, and wayes of his own appointment, and those who wait upon him herein, may drink of the Rivers of Eden, *Psal.* 36. 8. *one day here is better then a thousand.* *Psal.* 84. 10.

It is cleare from this discourse: there is no catholike, integral, political church: for an *integrum* is *species specialissima*, and cannot be divided into *species*, as wee see the catholike church is. And therefore I shall add no more for the present.

FINIS.